AFRICAN UNION
UNION AFRICAINE
UNIÃO AFRICANA
African Commission on Human &
Peoples’ Rights
Commission Africaine des Droits de
l’Homme & des Peuples
No. 31 Bijilo Annex Lay-out, Kombo North District, Western Region, P. O. Box 673, Banjul, The Gambia Tel: (220) 441 05
05 /441 05 06, Fax: (220) 441 05 04E-mail: achpr@achpr.org; Web www.achpr.org
REPORT OF THE
FACT-FINDING MISSION OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
TO BURUNDI
7 - 13 December 2015
1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
ABAS
Burundian-African Salvation Alliance
ANADDE
National Alliance for Law and Development
AU
African Union
AV-INTWARI
Alliance of the Brave
CNARED
National Council for Compliance with the Arusha
Agreement and Restoration of the Rule of Law in
Burundi
CNDD
National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNDD-FDD
National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for
the Defence of Democracy
EAC
East African Community
EU
European Union
FNL
National Liberation Front
FRODEBU
Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA
Front for National Liberation
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
INKINZO
Socialist and Pan-Africanist Party
MAPROBU
African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
MSD
Movement for Solidarity and Development
MSF
Doctors without Borders
NCID
National Commission on Inter-Burundian Dialogue
NHRC
National Human Rights Commission
OHCHR-B
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
in Burundi
PACONA
Party for National Concord
PALIPEHUTU
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PARENA
Party for National Recovery
PASIDE
Party for Science, Development and Environment
PBN
Burundi National Police
PIT
Workers’ Independent Party
PL
Liberal Party
PP
People’s Party
PPDRR
Party for Peace, Democracy, Reconciliation and
Reconstruction
PRP
People’s Reconciliation Party
PSC
Peace and Security Council
PSD
Social Democratic Party
RADDES
Movement for Democracy and Economic and Social
Development
RPA
African Public Radio
RPB
Burundi People’s Movement
RTNB
Burundi National Radio and Television
SNR
National Intelligence Service
TJRC
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UN
United Nations
UPD
Union for Peace and Democracy
UPRONA
Union for National Progress
2
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. At its 551st meeting held on 17 October 2015 in Addis Ababa on the
situation in Burundi, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
(AU), in Communiqué IV, PSC/PR /COMM.(DLI), requested the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) to urgently
undertake an in-depth investigation into the violation of human rights and
other abuses against civilian populations in Burundi.
2. At the request of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and conscious
of its mandate to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in Africa
under Articles 45 and 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights and its Rules of Procedure, the Commission decided to undertake a
fact-finding mission in the Republic of Burundi from 7 to 13 December
2015.
i.
Overall objectives
3. The overall objectives of the fact-finding mission were to:
i. Investigate, document and prepare a report on violations and
other abuses in Burundi;
ii. Present a report with recommendations to the Peace and
Security Council.
ii.
Specific objectives
4. The specific objectives were as follows:
− Investigate all forms of human rights violations and other abuses
committed in Burundi since the beginning of the crisis in April 2015;
− Establish the causes, facts and circumstances of the violations on the
basis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
relevant international human rights instruments and international
humanitarian law;
− Specify and classify human rights violations and other abuses
committed since the beginning of the current crisis;
− Present facts and information in a report and submit its findings to
the Peace and Security Council;
− Prepare and propose to the Peace and Security Council
recommendations following its investigation, including on:
✓ The urgent measures to be taken to put an end to the ongoing human rights violations and abuses as an important
stage in preventing the escalation of the crisis;
✓ The measures to be taken by the various stakeholders to
ensure that government security forces and all other armed
3
groups and militias refrain from committing human rights
violations and other abuses;
✓ The manner in which human rights related issues should and
can be adequately reflected and taken into account in regional
and AU mediation efforts;
✓ The problem of impunity for the alleged perpetrators of
human rights violations and other abuses and accountability;
✓ National truth, justice and reconciliation mechanisms and the
necessary institutional reforms, in particular reforms in the
security sector, criminal justice administration, and legislative
and administrative reform in the area of freedom of
association and expression.
iii.
Composition of the Delegation
5. The delegation was composed of the following:
− Honourable Commissioner Pansy Tlakula, Chairperson of the African
Commission and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and
Access to Information in Africa (Head of Delegation);
− Honourable Commissioner Reine Alapini-Gansou, Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights Defenders in Africa;
− Honourable Commissioner Maya Sahli-Fadel, Special Rapporteur on
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants
in Africa;
− Honourable Commissioner Jamesina E.L. King, Chairperson of the
Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa;
− Honourable Commissioner Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso, Chairperson of
the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and
Human Rights Violations in Africa and Focal Point for Transitional
Justice.
6. However, as a result of the incident that occurred on 11 December
2015, and included heavy gunfight between security forces and forces
against the regime, Honourable Commissioner Maya Sahli-Fadel, who
was supposed to join the mission, was unable to travel due to flight
cancellations and insecurity in the country.
7. The members of the Delegation were accompanied by the following
members of staff of the Secretariat of the Commission:
−
−
−
−
Ms Estelle Nkounkou Ngongo, Legal Officer;
Mr Bruno Menzan, Legal Officer;
Mr Valentine Tazi, Interpreter-Translator;
Mr Frederick Tamakloe, Finance Officer.
4
8. During the mission, the Delegation held meetings with the various
stakeholders involved in the crisis and other actors. The Delegation
met with government officials, journalists, civil society organisations,
women’s associations, the National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC), the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), the
National Commission on Inter-Burundian Dialogue (NCID), the mayor
and the administrators of Bujumbura, members of the diplomatic
corps, members of the National Assembly, the Director General of
Police, African Union military experts and human rights observers,
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
Delegation also visited a hospital manned by Doctors without Borders
(MSF) and the Mpimba prison.
9. The Delegation also held working sessions with the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi (OHCHR-B). Due to
time constraints, the Delegation was unable to visit the Bujumbura
military hospital and to meet with some stakeholders such as
representatives of religious groups and some representatives of
political parties. The Chairperson of the Commission and Head of
Delegation, Honourable Commissioner Pansy Tlaklula and
Honourable Commissioner Reine Alapini-Gansou held a meeting with
the First Vice-President of the Republic of Burundi.
10. This report contains the Commission’s findings on the meetings it held
with the various stakeholders involved in the crisis in Burundi with
particular focus on the violations that were committed and are ongoing in the country. The Delegation had limited movement, and was
unable to meet with all the relevant stakeholders as a result of their
unavailability and insecurity. The Delegation also faced the thorny
issue of witness protection, as it received reports of cases of reprisals
against individuals who collaborated with regional and sub-regional
organisations.
iv.
Methodology
11. This report uses several sources, both primary and secondary. The
primary sources include discussions held between the Delegation and
the various stakeholders, and statements from victims and witnesses.
Secondary sources include reports from institutions working in the
country such as the AU observers and information provided by civil
society organisations which have been documenting violations since
the beginning of the crisis. The Delegation analysed all the information
gathered, classified them into the various categories and after analysis,
made its recommendations.
5
12. Even though the Delegation did not have sufficient time, and the
possibility of travelling to meet all the stakeholders and people from
whom it planned to gather the relevant information, the Commission
has been able to do an in-depth analysis on the basis of the information
gathered from the various individuals met, as well as several
documents, including reports that were received. These reports and the
meetings held with the various stakeholders enabled the Commission
to assess the level of the violations in Burundi.
13. The main characteristic of this report is that it focuses mainly on the
various human rights violations that had occurred and violations that
occurred during the mission and their impact on the evolution of the
conflict. The violations were analysed based on the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights which, as reflected in its title, “promotes
and protects peoples’ rights”. As such, the Delegation’s report will not
only focus on the violation of the rights of individuals, even if such
violations were committed on a large scale, but will also include
violations of the rights of Burundians as a people and the consequences
on the population.
v.
Structure of the Report
14. This report contains 4 main parts. The introduction presents the legal
framework and the origin of the mission, its mandate and
methodology. Part 2 highlights the background and human rights
violations, in particular the institutional, political, legal and historical
background, causes of the crisis and an identification of the most
affected areas. Part 3 deals with human rights violations and abuses
noted and reported, including the nature and seriousness, the impact
of the crisis on human rights protection institutions, the identification,
classification and description of the various human rights violations
and other abuses that occurred during the crisis. Lastly, Part 4 deals
with the findings and conclusions of the mission, including the nature
and seriousness of the violations, the victims and perpetrators of
human rights violations, and the Delegation’s recommendations
following the mission.
II BACKGROUND OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
15. In order to better understand the nature of the human rights violations
and other abuses committed in Burundi, it is important to recall the
background of the current crisis to be able to have a full picture and the
consequences through an analysis of the institutional, political and
legal background.
i.
Institutional background
6
16. The history of the Constitution of Burundi began before the country
gained its independence. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Burundi
was proclaimed on 23 November 1961, by the Mwami Mwambutsa IV1.
A “final” Constitution of the Kingdom was proclaimed on 16 October
1962 and entered into force, with retroactive effect, on 1 July 1962.
Following the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of the
Republic on 28 November 1966, Burundi experienced several periods
of “Constitutional void”, in particular following the various coups
d’états in the country’s political history.2 Following the adoption of the
“final Constitution” of the Kingdom of Burundi, Burundi as a Republic
adopted the following several constitutions and other instruments
aimed at governing the country’s institutions given the specific
situations of its political history:
− Constitution of 11 July 1974;
− Constitution of 20 November 1981;
− Charter of National Unity of 5 February 1991;
− Constitution of 13 March 1992, adopted by referendum on 9 March
1992;
− Decree-Law of 13 September 1996 to organise the transitional
institutional system;
− Transitional Constitutional Act of 6 June 1998;
− Transitional Constitution of 28 October 2001;
− Law of 21 November 2003 to amend the Transitional
Constitution of 28 October 2001;
− Interim Post-transition Constitution of 20 October 2004;
− Constitution of 18 March 2005.
17. On 9 and 10 October 2013, a bill to modify some provisions of the
Constitution of Burundi was adopted by the Council of Ministers. The
objective of the bill was to abrogate and replace the amendment of the
Constitution of 18 March 2005. After several amendments to the
initially adopted text, a bill to amend some provisions of the
Constitution was tabled before the National Assembly. However,
failing to obtain the required number of votes, the bill was not adopted
by the National Assembly.3
1King of the Kingdom of Burundi from 16 December 1915 to 8 July 1966
2 Burundi experienced four (4) coups d’états, three (3) of which succeeded. 1 November 1976: overthrow
of President Michel Micombero (November 1966-November 1976); 3 September 1987: overthrow of
President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (November 1976-September 1987); 25 July 1996: overthrow of President
Sylvestre Htibantungaya (April 1994-July 1996); 13 May 2015: failed coup d’état against President Pierre
Nkurunziza.
3https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/rg/iob/centre-great-lakes/dpp-burundi/constitution/aper-u-histconst/
7
18. In 1992, Burundi established its first Constitutional Court, which was
abolished following the coup d’état of Pierre Buyoya4 by the DecreeLaw of 13 September 1996 to organize the transitional institutional
system5. A new Constitutional Court was established by the
Transitional Constitutional Act of 6 June 1998. The Transitional
Constitution of 28 October 2001 and the Constitution of 18 March 2005
(which is the Constitution currently in force) also provide for the
establishment of a Constitutional Court.6
19. Since the signing of the Arusha Agreement on 28 August 2000,
Burundian institutions have been functioning according to bases that
were laid by these agreements and strengthened by the Constitution of
2005, in particular the amendment of the ethnic composition in the
military and administration, with an ethnic re-balancing of these two
institutions, a Hutu-Tutsi executive.
20. Moreover, in order to ensure the success of the implementation of
these agreements, several recommendations, such as the importance of
a multi-ethnic presidency, a government of national unity, significant
majorities necessary for decision-making, the need for a strong
Constitutional Court, and the importance of including several
provisions prohibiting discrimination, exclusion and ethnic hatred
were contained in explanatory notes on the Arusha Protocol,
summarizing proposals on the constitution and the transitional period
in Burundi.7 The model established by the Arusha Agreement worked
and Burundi respected the provisions of the Arusha Agreement with
more or less success.
21. The issue of Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term bid, in particular the
different interpretations of Articles 96 and 302 of the 2005 Constitution
on the limitation of terms, and the subsequent disastrous
consequences, undermined Burundi’s institutional and political
stability. The main stake of the conflict was more of the survival of the
Arusha Agreement than the re-election of President Pierre
Nkurunziza. Even though the institutions continue to function, some
people doubt their capacity, in particular with regard to credibility,
especially concerning institutions that guarantee the protection of the
rights of citizens and human rights in particular.
22. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice, the National Human Rights
Commission, and even the police are increasingly seen by many
observers as being partial. The people also seem to distance themselves
4Former President of the Republic from September to July 1993, and from July 1996 to April 2003
5https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/rg/iob/centre-great-lakes/dpp-burundi/constitution/cour-
constitutionnel/
6 See previous note
7 Arusha Agreement, http://bnub.unmissions.org/Portals/bnub-french/accorddarusha.pdf
8
from these institutions, which they feel are not capable of properly
addressing their concerns, in particular in providing justice and
protection.
ii.
Political background
23. The current Burundian crisis is the last of a long list of crises which
Burundi has unfortunately been experiencing since independence. The
country has experienced several major crises8, the most deadly being
the 1993 crisis which triggered a close to 8-year civil war. In order to
put an end to this deadly war, a peace agreement was signed on 28
August 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania, under the auspices of Nelson
Mandela.
24. The following 17 political parties signed the Arusha Agreement:
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
Burundian-African Salvation Alliance(ABAS) ;
National Alliance for Law and Development(ANADDE);
Alliance of the Brave(AV-INTWARI);
National Council for the Defence of Democracy(CNDD);
Front for Democracy in Burundi(FRODEBU);
Front for National Liberation(FROLINA);
Socialist and Pan-Africanist Party(INKINZO);
Le Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) ;
Party for National Recovery(PARENA);
Workers’ Independent Party (PIT);
Liberal Party(PL);
People’s Party(PP);
People’s Reconciliation Party(PRP);
Social Democratic Party(PSD);
Movement for Democracy and Economic and Social
Development(RADDES);
− Burundi People’s Movement(RPB); and
− Union for National Progress (UPRONA).
25. However, since 2005, the Burundian political landscape is dominated
by the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the
Defence of Democracy, led by Pierre Nkurunziza, which was the main
winner of the commune elections of 5 June 2005, winning 1,781 out of
3,225 seats, with a score of 62.9%, with FRODEBU winning 20.5% and
UPRONA winning only 5.3%. The CNDD-FDD, a Hutu-majority
8On 29 April 1972, Hutu groups led by the UBU organisation, Umugambwew'Abakozib'Uburundi or
Burundi Workers’ Party, tried to seize power by eliminating Tutsis. At the beginning of the insurrection,
the former king, King Ntare V, was assassinated, putting an end to any possibility of a return to
monarchy since NtareNdizeye was the only male child of the Ganwa dynasty and the only legitimate
heir to the throne. The insurrection was brutally brought to an end, with close to 100,000 people
massacred. Another wave of violence occurred in Bujumbura and in the north-east in October 1991 but
was limited to these areas..https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_du_Burundi
9
party9, also won the absolute majority in 11 of the country’s 17
provinces. This CNDD-FDD landslide victory brought an end to the
domination of the political landscape by UPRONA and FRODEBU.
CNDD-FDD’s domination was confirmed in 2010 when the party took
the lead in almost all the 129 councils and its Chairman Pierre
Nkurunziza was re-elected as President of the Republic.
26. Today, CNDD-FDD remains the dominant party and many parties
have practically disappeared from the political scene while others have
merged, such as the Burundian-African Salvation Alliance (ABAS), the
Party for National Concord (PACONA) and the Party for Peace,
Democracy, Reconciliation and Reconstruction (PPDRR) which came
together to form a new party, the Party for Science, Development and
Environment (PASIDE), a green party.10
27. In April 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his
intention to run for a third term of office, five opposition parties and
dissidents of Mr Nkurunziza’s party, the CNDD-FDD, launched a
“campaign” to prevent him from running again for office. On 31 July
2015 in Addis Ababa, 9 political parties11, members of civil society, two
former presidents12 and some officials established the National Council
for Compliance with the Arusha Agreement and Restoration of the Rule
of Law in Burundi (CNARED), a coalition of all groups opposed to
President Nkurunziza’s third term bid. Despite President Nkurunziza’s
victory in the July 2015 elections, the establishment of CNARED which
includes membership from several CNDD-FDD factions shows the
weakening of the president’s powers, and he needs to address the split
in his own party.
iii.
Legal background
28. The legal protection and promotion of human rights in Burundi is
guaranteed by the Constitution through the integration in the internal
legal system of a good number of signed and/or ratified regional and
international instruments relating to human rights. Article 19 of the
Constitution which makes reference to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948), International Pacts relating to Civil and Political
Rights (1966), to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(1966) as well as
The population of Burundi comprises Hutus (85%), Tutsis (14%) and Twa (1%). Power is shared
among the representatives of the three ethnic groups on the basis of a quota system established by the
Arusha Agreement.
10http://www.burundi-forum.org/trois-partis-politiques-fusionnent
11 CNDD, CNDD-FDD Abqryumyeko, CNDD-FDD Epris de paix, IIMBONO Charisma, MSD,
Sahwanya Party, UPD Ziyamibanga Party and UPRONA Party.
12 Former presidents Sylvestre Ntibantungaya (April 1994-July 1996) and Domitien Ndayiziye
(30 April 2003 – 26 August 2005)
9
10
their protocols, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(1981), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women (1979) and the Convention relating to
the Rights of the Child (1989) are part and parcel of the Constitution of
the Republic of Burundi. Burundi has equally, at the African level,
ratified instruments relating to categorical protection of certain groups,
notably the Convention governing aspects pertaining solely to refugee
problems (1951), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child (1990) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights relating to Women’s Rights in Africa (2003).
29. In order to honour its international commitments in the domain of
human rights, Burundi respects the principle of separation of powers
(executive, legislative and judiciary) and has set up independent
institutions enshrined in the Constitution notably the Ombudsman and
the National Independent Electoral Commission. Besides, there are
non-constitutional institutions such as Bashingantahe13 which contribute
significantly to the respect of the promotion and protection of human
rights notably the National Independent Commission on Human
Rights (CNIDH).The separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary arm were introduced by the Constitution of 13 March 1992
and are enshrined in the present Constitution. However, in spite of its
independence guaranteed by the Constitution since two decades, the
Burundian justice has orchestrated several criticisms, analyses and
reform proposals.
iv.
The Arusha Agreement
30. It is the underlying instrument of peace in Burundi. The consociational
model of power sharing between the majority Hutu (85 % of the
population), currently in power, and the minority Tutsi (14 % of
Burundians), for long at the helm of the country, was the solution to a civil
war spanning several decades.14 The Arusha Agreement, which came into
force on 1 November 2001, had provided for the setting up of a
transitional national assembly, with the FRODEBU Chairperson, Jean
Minani, as Speaker and pending legislative and council elections slated for
2003 and presidential elections for 2004, a 3-year transitional period with
Major Pierre Buyoya as president and DomitienNdayizeye as vicepresident for a period of 18 months. The envisaged change was respected.
The government portfolios were shared between the UPRONA and the
13 These are wise people from Baganwa, Bahutu and Batutsi tribes who were judges and advisers at all
levels of government and were, among other elements, a cohesion factor (Arusha Agreement)
14« Burundi:
Arusha
Agreement
in
danger,
peace
deferred?
»Violette
Tournier
https://afriquedecryptages.wordpress.com/2014/06/11/burundi-laccord-darusha-en-danger-la-paixen-sursis/
11
FRODEBU. On 4 February 2002, the transitional Senate elected Libère
Bararunyeretse (UPRONA) as its president.
v. Peace Agreement (Pretoria Agreement)
31. In July 2003, Hutus forces of the CNDD-FDD, in coalition with the
PALIPEHUTU-FNL, attacked Bujumbura, causing massive displacement
of the population (about 40 000 inhabitants fled the capital). To put an end
to this new conflict, a peace agreement (Pretoria Agreement) was signed
between President
Ndayizeye
and the
CNDD-FDD
leader
on 15 November 2003 in Pretoria, South Africa. This agreement enabled
the CNDD-FDD to join the government in which it had four ministries
and top-ranking positions in other institutions, pursuant to the Arusha
Agreement.
vi.
The causes and authors of the current crisis
32. To many observers, including the parties involved, the origins of the crisis
date far back before April 2015. Indeed, this large popular hostility to what
it considered as the violation of the Constitution was prompted by a neargeneral discontent with the country’s management during the second term
of the current president. Demonstrations organized by political parties
and the civil society opposed to the third term by President Nkurunziza,
were violently suppressed by the defence and security forces resulting in
over a hundred dead, the destruction of the private media, several arrests
of soldiers suspected to have masterminded and attempted to topple the
regime.
33. Beyond the divergent opinions in the interpretation of the provisions of
the Arusha Agreement, several people uphold that the underlying
problem was the ascension to power and according to some people by all
means, although the demonstrations started in April, after the
announcement of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy. Others claim
that the demonstrations had been prepared long ago and the
announcement of the candidacy was the ideal pretext to kick-start the
demonstrations.
34. In fact, for those in support of a third term, Article 96 of the Constitution
is clear on the number of terms in the sense that it stipulates that “The
President of the Republic shall be elected through direct universal suffrage
for a term of five (5) years, renewable once.” This is perfectly in line with the
Arusha Agreement which stipulates: “The President of the Republic shall be
elected for a term of five (5) years renewable once. Nobody shall be President
for more than two terms.” Hence, to uphold their view, those in support of
the third term, argue that during his first election, President Pierre
Nkunriziza was elected through indirect universal suffrage, meaning that
only the 2010 election should be considered as his first term, as he was
12
elected through direct universal suffrage in accordance with the
provisions of Article 96 of the Constitution.
35. To the opponents of a third term, the argument advanced by the
presidential camp is not defendable as the limitation to two terms is
unequivocal according to the terms of Article 96.15The exception to the
mode of election stipulated in Article 302 (1) of the Constitution of 2005
which states that “exceptionally, the first President of the post-transitional
period shall be elected by the National Assembly and the Senate meeting
in Congress, by a two-third majority of its members….” has nothing to do
with the limitation of the terms of office of the President. It is only an
exemption to the clarification brought by the 2005 Constitution with
regard to the Arusha Agreement as concerns the mode of electing the
President of the Republic, notably direct universal suffrage.16 It cannot in
any way be used as a valid argument to justify the violation of the
obligation to the limitation of terms, stipulated in Article 96 of the
Constitution.
36. Hence, for the opponents, the first term for which he was elected through
indirect universal suffrage pursuant to Article 302 should be counted as
his first term and that of 2010as the second. For, what matters is the
number of terms and not the mode of election. A third term is also a
violation of the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement.
vii.
Political pressure on the Constitution Court
37. According to the provisions of the Arusha Agreement, the Constitutional
Court has received full judicial powers to ensure that the Constitution is
applied and to act as guarantor of this Constitution, even if it has to be
against the Executive and the Legislative. The ethnically balanced Senate
must endorse nominations at the Constitutional Court and within other
important courts.
38. However, the Constitutional Court was deprived of its independence
when it had to rule on the validity of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s
candidacy for an additional term. Indeed, according to the Vice- President
of the Constitutional Court, Sylvère Nimpagaritse, now in exile, members
of the court reportedly had pressure from the government to validate the
candidacy, hence, he declared that: on the night of 30 April, they already
started having enormous pressure and even death threats; those against
the validation are said to affirmed that if they did not support the cause,
15 «
2015 :Burundi at the cross-roads » Isaac Nizigamahttp://www.arib.info/Isaac-Nizigama-2015-LeBurundi-a-la%20croisee-des-chemins.pdf
16 See preceding note
13
they would have contributed in humiliating the President thereby risking
their lives. Sylvère Nimpagaritse refused to succumb and went on exile.
39. While contributing to the deterioration, this situation deprived those in
support of the third term of the opportunity to have a genuine legal basis
of their demands and consoled the opposition in its conviction that the
third term was a contravention to the Constitution and the Arusha
Agreement.
viii.
The economic situation
40. From an economic perspective, Burundi is a developing country whose
economy relies basically on agriculture, as the other sectors have little to
offer. As is the case with post-conflict countries, owing to the crisis, several
partners have suspended their aid thereby pushing the economy into
recession.
The consequences of the political crisis are dramatic for business
persons, but also potentially disastrous for a staggering national
economy and an already weakened government.
41. Burundi, a small African country in the Great Lakes Region ravaged by a
long civil war (1993-2006), is one of the poorest countries on earth: gross
national income per capita of 260 dollars, 58% of the population suffers
from chronic malnutrition. It has very little exports made up mainly of
coffee, produced in very quality for self-food sufficiency and the country
is undermined by corruption.
42. A high repression ensued following the demonstrations, prompting
thousands of Burundians to flee out of the country, including several
taxpayers and amongst them business persons. The elections and the
setting up of institutions contested by the opposition and part of the
international community have not yet contributed to resolving the current
economic crisis.
ix.
The historical context marked by impunity vis-à-vis human rights
violations
43. Impunity in Burundi is the root cause of the several conflicts the country
has experienced to date. In actual fact, the intensity of violence noticed
since October 1993 is attributed to impunity for serious past crimes. In
spite of the unanimity on the need to put an end to this scourge, violence
has become residual among the Burundian population. Since the authors
of serious violations and other abuses during conflicts in the past
benefited from amnesties, Burundians seem to have the feeling that
impunity is a reality.
14
44. Moreover, a good number of present leaders and those who were at the
helm of the country, with some near exceptions, became so following a
coup d’état or after having been in the armed rebellion. Such a situation
significantly contributes to fan resentment notably from the victims who
feel doubly undermined. In a region where weapons are in circulation and
where it is possible to buy grenade for less than 10 dollars, the urge to
resort to violence is very high, especially when one fears no reprisals at all.
In addition to this is the residual violence that has taken roots among the
population. Many see killing as normal.
45. It important to curb impunity but above all to break the cycle of violence
by educating the population on the respect of life. However, this cannot be
done without strict application of justice and without the simple
forgiveness of authors of crimes who must assume their responsibilities,
so that the people should know that violence is not devoid of
consequences and that one has to be answerable for one’s crimes.
46. The issue of impunity has unfortunately not been at the centre of political
governance in Burundi in recent years and the frustrations it has triggered
off, in addition to other issues linked notably to unemployment, equal
sharing of wealth, the purchasing power, etc., have significantly
contributed to the escalation of the current crisis. For, beyond the issue of
a third term, numerous underlying questions including impunity are at
the origin of this crisis and its resolution must take into account these
various parameters so as to find a lasting solution to the cycle of violence
in Burundi.
x.
The most affected by the violence and the occurrence of human
rights violations
47. The demonstrations took place in the capital, Bujumbura, more precisely
in the neighbourhoods of Musaga, Jabe, Buyenzi, Kirundo, Nyakabiga,
Bwiza, Cibitoke, Kanyosha, Mutakura, considered as “opposing”
neighbourhoods. However, according to reliable sources, it was reported
that certain incidents equally occurred within the country, notably on the
hills and borders of the country (Tanzania; Democratic Republic of Congo
and Rwanda).
III.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND OTHER ABUSES
48. Before unveiling all forms of human rights violation linked to the crisis,
the Delegation’s mission report presents the scope of the said violations
and their impact on the institutions charged with the protection of
human rights.
15
i.
The scope of human rights violations regarding the crisis and the impact
of the crisis on the institutions17 charged with the protection of human
rights
49. Prior to the Delegation’s arrival in Burundi to carry its fact-finding
mission, reports from diverse reliable sources18talked of violation of
human rights and other abuses perpetrated in Burundi. Moreover, it was
on the basis of these continuous allegations and denunciations and given
the current alarming developments in Burundi that the AU Peace and
Security Council requested that the Commission lead a substantial factfinding mission on human rights violations and other abuses resulting
from the crisis that materially started on 26 April 2015.
50. In the course of its mission, the Delegation noted that although the crisis
was basically in the capital, Bujumbura, the crisis and the ensuing human
rights violations have an impact and repercussions on the entire country
with related incidents noted from time to time in certain parts of the
country, besides the capital. The Burundian crisis has consequently
undermined the country’s articulations and the institutions in charge of
the protection of human rights are not spared. Hence, from the
Ombudsman to the judiciary system including the Independent National
Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH), all the institutions are grappling
with the challenges stemming from the crisis as they conduct their mission
of protecting human rights.
51. In fact, concerning Ombudsman, the holder of the post, Dr Mohamed
Rukaka, left the country in the course of July 2015 after a speech
presenting the role of his structure in preventing conflicts before and
during the crisis and which denounced the various forms of human rights
violation and urged the parties in conflict to dialogue. Concerning the
CNIDH, according to the discussions that the Delegation had with the
chairperson of this institution and various stakeholders on the field, the
institution’s stance in the crisis is delicate and even controversial. Thus,
according to them, the CNIDH is accused of partiality by the groups
opposing the present government and of defending “criminals” who want
to destabilize “legal and legitimate” institutions put in place by the
government in power depending on the stance that the institution may
take.
17The notion of “human rights protection institutions” is considered here in its strictest sense and targets
only the structures set up by the State to specifically protect human rights.
18 The media, local and international human rights organizations, humanitarian organizations and UN
system as well as diplomatic representations accredited to Burundi.
16
52. As for the legal system that was already under pressure before the crisis19,
it worsened and significantly impacted on the system’s ability to react
diligently and with impartiality in its mission in the sense that the nature
of the crisis increased the cases falling within the purview of justice and
instituted a total mistrust and even the defiance of the party against the
government vis-à-vis justice. Moreover, partners who technically and
financially support the work of the judiciary interrupted20 this support in a
way that there is a vacuum very detrimental to the efficiency of the
system.
53. The common outcome of the crisis on these institutions is in fact the
discredit of these institutions which have to be the unshakable bulwarks,
especially in a crisis context, against all forms of human rights violation.
Consequently, through their inability to carry out their mission owing to
the context, they find themselves in a position of de facto actors of the
deterioration of the human rights situation in the country.
ii.
Determination, description and qualification of human rights violations
and other abuses that occurred during the various phases of the crisis
54. The Delegation carried out its analysis on the basis of the rights protected
by the African Charter. Hence, as expounded here above, the Delegation
noted a violation of virtually all the rights protected by the African
Charter.
• Violation of the right to non-discrimination (Article 2)
55. The Delegation deduced the violation of the right to non-discrimination
due to the polarization of the positions of each of the opposing parties in
the Burundian conflict. This political polarization the Gordian knot of
which is the issue of the third term, itself stemming from the
disagreement in the interpretation of the Arusha Agreement and the
Burundian Constitution pets two antagonistic camps which continuously
assault each other on a daily basis by commenting the violations of
human rights based on opinion and the real or alleged political
affiliations.
56. The Delegation noted targeted assassinations of political and military
leaders, the arbitrary arrests and detentions of demonstrators against the
third term, the destruction and sealing up of media houses and the
suspension of civil society organizations on the assumption that these
people and entities were opposed to the government in power. Moreover,
19 See the Burundian government final report of 2009 produced by AFRICA LABEL GROUP within the
framework of the World Bank Economic Management Support Project (PAGE) and titled “Diagnostic
study of the Burundian legal and judiciary system” and the UN Independent Expert on Burundi.
20 To illustrate this, one can cite the suspension of the Belgian cooperation which, according to the
analyses of certain actors met, had a negative impact on the judiciary system with lack of celerity and
shortcomings in legal proceedings.
17
the police and security forces as well as the supporters of the third term
and of the current government are targeted on the basis of their actual or
alleged membership and political opinion. This therefore constitutes
discrimination based on political opinion, in violation of the rights
guaranteed by the African Charter in Article 2.
•
Violations of the right to equality before the law and the right to
equal protection by the law (Article 3)
57. The delegation found that instability reigns in some areas of the country
where their inhabitants are not protected in the same way as those in more
or less secured zones. Also interviews with various actors brought to the
fore the little diligence and the slow efforts and procedures put in placed
in respect of the violations suffered by opponents of the third term, with
the state apparatus putting more celerity on addressing issues affecting its
supporters. This is the case, for example, with the files concerning the
coup d’état and the assassination of General Adolphe Nshimirimana21in
which the alleged perpetrators are in custody and proceedings are ongoing. For the case of the leaders of the Opposition and human rights
activists attacked or killed, the authorities say investigations are still ongoing with no tangible evidence of imminent results.
58. The Delegation was equally able to gather evidence supporting that there
had been discrimination in the right to demonstrate. Indeed, while public
demonstrations are banned, supporters of the government in power are
allowed to demonstrate at any moment under the protection of security
forces, while the opposition demonstrations are repressed violently.
•
Violations of the rights to life (Article 4)
59. The Delegation was informed of cases of violations of the right to life in
connection with the crisis. The available statistics22 could not be subject to
thorough checks since the delegation did not have the technical and
logistical resources for this purpose. However, during the Delegation’s
mission, incidents of unprecedented violence occurred almost on a daily
basis and got the climax in the night of 10 to 11 December 2015. These
incidents reportedly claimed the lives of at least one hundred people
belonging to all origins put together.
60. The Delegation was informed of the attack by unidentified gunmen
against three military camps in Bujumbura against which the regular
security forces were said to have retaliated. During the mop-up operation
organized to identify and arrest the alleged perpetrators, there were
alleged summary executions. The existence of mass graves was also
21 See the rest of the report.
22 The death toll linked to the crisis was about 400 when the Delegation was undertaking its mission.
18
reported to the Delegation. Although all those allegations have not been
materially ascertained by the Delegation, it witnessed from where it was
lodging explosions and other loud noises that lasted over 24 hours and
which, obviously, are evidence of violent clashes between the opponents
and security forces. Moreover, the military authorities announced a total
of 87 dead after military operations.
61. Having abolished the death penalty23, Burundi has emphasized the
importance it attaches to the right to life. Also any injury to life, whatever
the context (peace-armed conflict), is condemnable. As the first guarantor
of this law, the State should exercise restraint, especially when it organizes
mop-up operations to apprehend the alleged perpetrators. The Delegation
noted that concerning the right to life, the figure of 400 dead or more,
according to some sources, is advanced. However, as stated earlier, this
figure has not be verified. Violations of the right to life brought to the
attention of the Delegation include targeted killings and summary
executions.
62. Targeted assassinations concerned some personalities and leaders of
political parties or civil society. From 5 August to 22 September, the total
of targeted killings was 3 for well-known personalities. They include
Colonel Jean Bikomagu, former Chief of Staff; Potien Barutiwanayo,
administrator of Isale Council, member of Agathon Rwasa’s FNL and
Patrice Gahungu, UPD24 spokesman.
63. The cases of assassinations of political party activists and unidentified
persons were also documented. For instance, Abel Sabimana, teacher,
MDS member, a political party of radical opposition, was killed. His wife,
Annick Nininahawze, who was wounded, was hospitalized at the
“Hopital Arche de Kigobe” run by Doctors without Borders (MSF). The
MSD party has more victims because it was the first party to side with the
civil society in the month of March in the popular protest against the third
term.
64. Between 19 August and 28 September 2015, 22 cases of dead bodies, found
in certain places in the city of Bujumbura and in the hinterland, were
registered. The majority of the dead bodies have not yet been identified.
Those that have been identified are a soldier and members of political
parties including the MSD. Cases of assassinations or attempted
assassination of activists of the CNDD-FDD, allied parties, and military
figures were equally reported.
23 See the Burundi Penal Code enacted on 22 April 2009.
24 Information gathered from AU human rights observers dispatched to Burundi to monitor violations
of human rights within the framework of the crisis.
19
65. On 11 September, there was attempted assignation of the Armed Chief of
Staff, General Prime Niyongabo, who was going to his office. In addition,
nearly 55 cases of summary execution were recorded during the month of
October 2015.
66. From the examples cited, it cannot be denied that the right to life as
enshrined in Article3 of the African Charter was violated. Also according
to international jurisprudence and that of the Commission25, there is a
violation of the right to life when the State does not take action to
investigate and establish responsibility when its forces of law and order
kill using their weapons. Despite repeated requests, the Delegation was
unable to obtain evidence from authorities that measures had been taken
to establish responsibility and punish those responsible.
•
Violations of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (Article 5)
67. Reports of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment were given to
the Delegation during its mission. The actors reported cases of violent
beatings, the use of acid, acts of torture by injection, suspension of heavy
objects by male genitalia among others. According to reports received,
most of the victims were members or supporters of opposition political
parties and those accused of participation in armed gangs or in a rebel
movement. The victims refused to file complaints for fear of reprisals.
Certain cases of allegations of torture, abuse and other degrading
treatment were confirmed by the CNIDH.
68. According to reports, these acts occurred in several places. These are
places where demonstrations were staged against the third term, the
premises of the National Intelligence Service (SNR), judicial police, places
of arrests or nearby places and places of custody through Bujumbura,
checkpoints erected by self-defence and vigilante groups, etc.
69. Regarding statistics, the data received by the Delegation varies depending
on reliable sources but till that time, there would be a little over 142 cases
of torture and ill-treatment listed since the beginning of the crisis.26 On
analysis of its information, the Delegation believed that torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment tend to be systematic.
•
Violations of the right to liberty and to the security of his person
(Article 6)
25 Communication 288/04 Gabriel Shumba v Zimbabwe, May 2012.
26 For example, for the month of October 2015, an organization was able to document 55 cases of torture
on the SNR premises only.
20
70. Many cases of violation of Article 6 of the African Charter were reported
to the Delegation. The information collected enabled the Delegation to
reconstruct the framework and the contexts in which arbitrary arrests and
detentions occur. Thus, during the period 26 April to the first phase of the
crisis on the eve of the failed coup of 12 May 2015, all persons rightly or
wrongly suspected to have taken part in protests against the third term
were arrested and detained for participating in an illegal demonstration
and disturbing public order.
71. Subsequently, during the period marking the second phase of the crisis
and that is after the failed coup and the July 2015 election, the main
objective was to arrest all those rightly or wrongly, suspected of having
participated or supported the coup. Moreover, according to some
accounts, the government wanted to silence, by means of detention, all the
voices raised against the holding of elections in July 2015.
72. The current phase of the crisis began after the end of elections in July2015.
Arbitrary detentions and arrests were then directed against all persons
wrongly or rightly suspected of being against the government. This
includes the continued arrests and detention of persons who participated
in the protests against the third term, those who supported or participated
in the failed coup and all those active in the war being waged by
unidentified armed groups against regular forces of order.
73. Given the means and methods that were used in arresting and detaining
people, as well as justifications thereof (mere suspicion), the Delegation
thinks that these were to greater extent arbitrary. Similarly, it should
equally be stressed that many other rights such as the right to defence
were also violated. Thus, those detained were not notified of the charges
brought against them, nor were they informed of their rights. In addition,
many do not have access to their families and lawyers and are often held
incommunicado. In addition to this, the abnormally long time limit in
remand due to the weakening of the judiciary system following the
withdrawal of technical and financial partners who supported the system
and the influx of cases before the courts since the beginning of the crisis.
74. The Delegation noted that the arbitrary arrests and detentions are the most
common violations during this crisis. Indeed, the statistics obtained from
the actors present in the field show that they are not constant. For
example, the Ministry of Justice speaks of over 100 young protesters
detained in the context of the crisis and other sources deem that
approximately over 1400 persons have been arrested in connection with
the crisis but said that, in the meantime, some have been released.
•
Violations of the right to a fair trial and independence of the courts
(Articles 7 and 26)
21
75. The Delegation concluded that there were violations of the rights
guaranteed in Articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter following the
analysis of the information provided by the different actors met during the
mission. On the one hand, before the crisis, in the judiciary system,
according to some reports, there were malfunctions casting real doubt on
the ability of the system to fulfil its role as a third power in a democracy in
total independence, impartiality and in a competent way. This position is
supported by some expert reports as specified above.
76. On the other hand, the weaknesses of the judiciary system identified
above, have increased in the context of the crisis with high pressure from
government over certain higher courts including the Constitutional Court
whose vice-president27 abdicated and went on exile following the tensions
related to the legal and political debate on the third term. One of the
consequences of the pressure and State intervention in the judiciary
system is the non-elucidation of numerous cases of human rights violation
committed against individuals identified as being from the camp opposed
to the government, while situations relating to people supporting the
government are dealt with expeditiously.
77. The Delegation also noted in this regard, cases of excessively long pre-trial
detentions, lack of legal assistance for most poor defendants and other
malfunctions in the system owing, according to the convergent sources, to
the suspension of technical and financial aid from some international
partners because of the crisis.
•
Violations of the right to information and freedom of expression
(Article 9)
78. The Delegation confirmed the existence of violations of the right to
information and the right to freedom of expression on several concrete
elements. There has been arbitrary closure of media organs or acts of
intimidation and others against media organs to force them to "control"
their editorial line, limit their special coverage and their audience or
simply to stop all activities.28
79. This was followed by attacks and destruction of the media during the
clashes. The media organs targeted are; Isanganiroradio, Radio Publique
Africaine (RPA), Radio-TV Renaissance Bonesha-FM which were attacked,
looted or destroyed by government supporters. La radio Rema was
ransacked by protesters against the third term. As for the National Radio
27 This refers to Sylvère Nimpagaritse, vice-president of the Constitution Court who fled Burundi in
May 2015.
28 For example, media organs such as the RPA, la Radio Bonesha, la Radio Isaganiro, la RMA fm-Tv, la
Radio Renaissance-Tv and la Radio Humuriza were closed down by the authorities.
22
and Television of Burundi (RTBN), it was the purpose of the fight between
loyalists and putschists and it suffered damages.
80. The Delegation was able to interact with media professionals in exile
following the violation of their fundamental rights. It was informed that
over 100 media professionals are in exile and others are in hiding in the
country for fear of their lives. The Burundian media landscape has become
virtually unipolar and many media professionals practice self-censorship
in order not to incur the wrath of those in power. This limits people’s
access to a variety of information sources, but also to speak freely on
public issues without fear of reprisal.
•
Violations of the right to freedom of association and the right to
freedom of assembly (Article 10 and 11)
81. The Delegation got from the actors present in the field, the evidence of the
suspension of at least 10 civil society organizations on grounds that they
were involved in the attempt to overthrow the government took place on
13 May 2015 and is said to have been also the linchpin of demonstrations
in protest of the third term.29
82. The Delegation considers that this is arbitrary suspension and that the
authorities seem to be making confusion between individual responsibility
(which of course has not yet been established by the justice) and collective
responsibility. This could seriously undermine the freedom of association
of the Burundian population. The prohibitions of activities and assets
freezing against the most active civil society organisations in Burundi
equally violates freedom of assembly for members of these organizations.
•
Violations of the right to freedom of movement (Article 12)
83. During the crisis, numerous instances of violation of freedom of
movement were noted. The violations began with the protests against the
third term which led to the closure of several entire neighbourhoods and
preventing people who wanted to go about their activities. Then, the
institution of patrols and checkpoints by security forces limit the
movement of people on the pretext of the need to secure property and
people. In this regard, the Delegation was able to experience the
impossibility to move freely during clashes on 10 and 11December 2015.
The controlled sealing of the allegedly protest areas by the authorities
with a view to disarming people. The population was quarantined for
long hours as people could no longer move freely.
84. People fleeing the conflict either to neighbouring countries or within the
country are often arbitrarily detained on charges of participation or
29 See list of suspended organizations and the suspension order in annex.
23
support for an insurrection. The Delegation got information that in both
neighbourhoods known "protest" areas and in parts of the country totally
controlled by the government and its allies, self-defence and vigilante
groups were formed and they prevent people from moving freely thereby
substituting themselves to the police. All this has transformed Bujumbura
into de facto curfew city because nobody wants and cannot be away from
their home or to be out at night (6 pm).
•
Violations of the right to participation in public life (Article 13)
85. The Delegation noted that the controversy surrounding the third term
with the ensuing violence has severely undermined the credibility of the
elections that took place according to many observers. Hence, the election
boycott by a vast majority of the political actors, as well as the movement
of people who fled their usual places, it appears clear that the right to
participation in public life as guaranteed in Article13 of the African
Charter could not be exercised by many Burundians, not only during the
election period, but even far beyond.
86. Indeed, the absence of free will and informed choice has been lacking in a
crisis with violence. Considering that the position or political positioning
vis-à-vis the question concerning the rules governing the process of
participation in public life is the Gordian knot of this crisis, it would be
inappropriate to conclude that the current environment enables the
implementation of the right to participation in public life.
•
Violations of the right to the protection of families and vulnerable
groups (Article 18)
87. The Delegation opines that the crisis situation as described by the people
met during its mission can in no way guarantee the protection of families
and vulnerable groups. For the Delegation, the crisis has deconstructed the
unity of some families who had to flee out of the country or whose
members are scattered in various places because of the crisis.
88. Regarding the vulnerable persons, their vulnerability has increased with
the crisis. Thus, “la Maison Shalom”, an organization that looks after the
poorest, including orphans, saw its accounts frozen by the government on
the grounds that it was financing subversive actions. This has had
disastrous implications for people dependent on its services. Beyond this
case, there is that of thousands of refugees who are in a worrisome
situation and whose needs are increasingly difficult to be taken care of by
organisations that work with refugees.
89. The Delegation was informed of the detention of minors within the
framework of the crisis even though most of them were released at one
24
moment. To this, should be added the persistent but unverified
information on the recruitment of minors by armed groups.
•
Violations of the right to property (Article 14)
90. The Delegation gathered information alleging that goods and properties of
private individuals or public entities were destroyed during the crisis. The
demonstrators attacked State buildings and symbols during the strife.
Thus, local territorial authorities and other official vehicles have been
vandalized. There was also the destruction of movable and immovable
property such as houses, cars and other affairs of individuals and also
private business persons.
91. Besides, some people told the Delegation that disarmament operations by
the security forces and police activity because of certain armed groups are
followed by the dispossession of people of their material goods.
•
Violations of the right to work (Article 15)
92. Based partly on economic indicators since the crisis escalated, the
Delegation deduced that economic difficulties have an impact on the
people’s right to work. The fact that the business persons are forced to
stop activities due to insecurity (as is the case for many investors30,)
jeopardizes the employment of several Burundians.
93. Furthermore, the joint analysis of the difficulties in movement, the risks
that some public places run such as bars subjected to grenade attacks, and
the exodus of civilians, help to understand that several Burundian and
others were forced to abandon their jobs due to the crisis.
•
Violations of the right to health (Article 16)
94. The closure of areas by the security forces to disarm or search for
insurgent has consequences for the sick and wounded persons needing
care, who cannot visit health centres for lack of means of transport and for
fear of being targeted on the way. Moreover, some reports made to the
Delegation argued that some wounded people were followed right into
hospitals, as the wounded were arrested by the forces of law and order.
•
Violations of the right to education (Article 17)
95. It is common knowledge that without security, it is difficult for pupils and
students to attend classes. Burundi's situation does not permit the normal
functioning of educational structures (preschool, elementary, secondary
and university). Moreover, the sealing of neighbourhoods operated by the
30 Observers met on the spot could confirm this to the Delegation.
25
two parties in conflict and the mass displacement of population within the
country or out of the country are not likely to guarantee the right to
education.
•
Violations of the right of peoples to peace, the right to economic,
social and cultural development and the right of peoples to a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their development (Articles
22 ; 23 and 24)
96. The Delegation believes that only peace can promote economic, social and
cultural development by creating an environment conducive to
development in general. According to its analysis, the insecurity situation
in some parts of the country where all types of the activities have slowed
down due to fear, mistrust and distrust of some people vis-à-vis
institutions of the republic is likely to give rise to violations of Articles 22,
23 and 24 of the African Charter.
•
Other abuses
97. The Delegation noted that in addition to violations related to the African
Charter, other abuses such as intimidation, arrests against ransom and
blackmail are on-going in Burundi. These abuses are related to violations of
the human rights enumerated, and are caused by the lack of a stable security
order to report said abuses to the competent authorities.
98. Typical cases are those where armed men (regular and non-regular
forces), youth groups and other persons holding de facto power, as a
result of the crisis, intimidate, rob, humiliate, blackmail and even plunder
people who are left without recourse during and even after the events.
IV.
THE MISSION’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I.
The mission’s findings
99. At the end of its mission, the Delegation made certain findings relating to
the nature and scale of violations of human rights, the victims of violations
and the identification of perpetrators of the violations.
i.
Nature and scale of violations
100. The Delegation believes that the violations committed in Burundi over
the period concerned by its mission, can be described as serious, massive,
systematic, and generalized, to a certain extent. Others can be categorized
as continuous.
26
101. Thus, for the Delegation, the very serious nature of violations is due to
the fact they concern infringements on the right to life, without which
there is no right, as well as to the fact that they take the most ingenious
violent forms, to the extent of dehumanizing both the perpetrators and
victims of the said violations. This is seen in the cruelty of the acts of
torture reported to the Delegation and the physical abuse noted on the
death bodies discovered on the streets almost on a daily basis.
102. The massive nature of the violations is seen in the rate at which they
are committed, their high number and that of victims. As evidence,
statistics on the number of people killed per day, only for 11 December
2015, stood at 87, according to government sources. It should be
emphasized that, at the end of the mission, an official minimum total
figure of about 400 deaths was recorded just for the period running from
April ending to the second week of December 2015.
103. The Delegation also took into consideration the number of refugees
estimated at more than 215 000 and internally displaced persons, whose
statistics are not available, but which should be significant in light of the
massive movement of people from “opposition” or “rebel”
neighbourhoods to those considered as secure.
104. The Delegation feels that the crisis and the ensuing violations of
human rights affect almost the entire Burundian population at the social,
cultural, political, security and economic level, with a more or less heavy
impact depending on the localities.
105. According to the Delegation, the systematic, generalized and
continuous nature of violations is due to the high polarization of
conflicting positions and opposing parties. Indeed, systematization arises
from the will of each of the parties to neutralize the opposing party, by
every possible means, leading to a generalization of the crisis and
violations.
106. The Delegation also notes the continuous nature of violations owing to
the fact that the crisis and subsequent violations of human rights have
been continuing since its outbreak in April 2015 up to the mission’s
departure, and there were no signs at that moment indicating that it
would stop in the near future.
ii.
Victims of human rights violations
107. The Delegation notes that, even though the entire Burundian
population is suffering from the crisis situation prevailing in the country
and the ensuing violations of human rights, certain segments of this
population are particularly affected by these violations; these are youths,
27
women, children, members of the security forces, media organs, human
rights activists and civil society organizations.
108. However, they should be classified according to the criterion that
prevailed in their targeting by the perpetrators of violations, the victims
of whom they have become. Thus, all segments of the population
mentioned above are among the victims of violations and were targeted
either based on the real or perceived opinion of belonging to one of the
opposing parties or at least active or tacit support of one of them; or by
pure accident or opportunism of the opposing parties, in the case of
collateral damage due to clashes.
•
Demonstrators (real or perceived as such) against the third term
turned opponents (real or perceived as such) of the government in
power
109. Testimonies and interviews have revealed that most of the crisis
victims are among this category of persons. They are targets of the forces
of law and order, represented by the police and security forces, to which
can be added allied groups for the implementation of the sovereign role of
the State in maintenance of security, which are used to commit violations
of the type mentioned earlier in this report.
110. The Delegation, thus, noted that, during the interviews they had with
persons talking about crisis victims, mention was always made of the case
of young men, who were summarily shot or abducted, arrested, detained
and whose dead bodies were found on the streets. The Delegation could
observe this through photos and videos of the bullet-riddled bodies of
young men found on the streets, with hands often tied behind their backs.
The 11 December 2015 events, which, according to the government, led to
the death of 87 persons, revealed that young men constitute the majority
of victims.
111. They also, with a few exceptions, constitute the main victims of
violations of the right to life, acts of torture, cruel and degrading treatment
and other arbitrary arrests and detentions. This is because youths and
particularly young men, were the spearheads of opposition to the third
term and, subsequently, to the regime resulting from the July 2015
elections. As a result, the repression and counter-repression prevailing in
Burundi since April 2015 is due mainly to victims within actors that are,
for the most part, on the field.
112. Women, politicians, media organs, human rights activists, civil society
organizations and even members of the defence and security forces who
joined the protests or were perceived as supporting them, in one way or
28
the other, were also targeted. The latter are also victims of acts of violence
and other violations of human rights.
113. Women, on their part, live in a climate of perpetual fear, according to
evidence collected. However, there are very few reports on gender-based
violence, but women are victims of other forms of violations just like men,
even though to a lesser extent.
114. As concerns politicians that are members of the opposition or
perceived as such, many of them left the country following the wave of
targeted assassinations directed against them. So far, more than 100 media
professionals, human rights activists and civil society leaders live in exile,
in addition to politicians. These figures are only estimates and do not
include persons living in hiding in the country fearing for their lives and
fleeing from international warrants of arrest issued against most of the
actors linked to the 13 May 2015 coup d’état.
115. It is difficult at this stage, based on available statistics, to determine the
exact number of all categories mentioned in terms of persons killed,
wounded, arrested or detained arbitrarily, since the crisis broke out.
Similarly, quotas of each of the categories among the 215 000 or so
refugees and the unknown number of internally displaced persons cannot
be determined.
116. The Delegation notes, based on dependable evidence, that excessive
repression by the government and absence of dialogue among the parties
have pushed a section of third-term opponents to radicalization. For quite
some time now, this radicalized segment has been putting up an armed
resistance and the consequences are dramatic, marked by violent clashes
with security forces, almost on a daily basis, resulting in victims.
117. Excessive use of the police force and violence is not justifiable,
particularly when the latter is directed against a person or group whose
opinion is not in line with that of the authority: that is the more
condemnable when the target is just suspected or perceived as being
guilty. In the case of Burundi, the systematic trend has been that which
consists in the police force and allied groups indiscriminately attacking
persons, groups or structures perceived as defending or supporting
opponents to the current regime.
118. Examples of this type are legion and were reported to the Delegation
along with the description of the modus operandi of the repressive practices
of security forces, as an illustration. Thus, according to evidence collected,
when the Police is the target of attacks during one of its patrols, it carries
out retaliatory operations to look for the presumed perpetrators of the
attack and this often gives rise to arbitrary arrests, cruel, inhuman and
29
degrading treatment, abductions and even sometimes summary
executions, not to mention cases of sexual assault on women and theft of
the property of innocent civilians.
119. The Delegation was informed of several emblematic cases that
illustrate the scale of acts of violence against persons and entities opposed
to the third term or supposed to be. These especially are:
− Zedi Feruzi, Chairperson of the Union for Peace and Democracy
(UPD); assassinated on 23 May 2015 on his way home in the Ngagara
neighbourhood;
− Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa, eminent human rights activist, victim of an
assassination attempt on 3 August 2015; he received a bullet on the
face, fired by unknown persons on a bike in Bujumbura;
− Patrice Gahungu, spokesperson of the UPD opposition party shot on
Monday 7 September by unidentified individuals when he was
returning home in the Gihosha neighbourhood(north of Bujumbura);
− Welli Nzitonda, son of Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa. He was said to have
been found dead on 6 November 2015, a few hours after having been
arrested by the police.
120. During its mission, the Delegation was informed of the presumed
abduction by security forces of Mrs. Marie Claudette Kwizera, treasurer of
the ITEKA League, a civil society organization, and who, up to the
drafting of this report, has still not been found.
121. As concerns entities, media organs and civil society organizations have
also taken a heavy toll in the crisis. The Delegation makes reference to the
closure and destruction of several media organs and the suspension of the
activities of at least 10 local civil society organizations.
•
Third-term activists and supporters (real or perceived as such)
turned those of the regime (real or perceived as such)
122. According to certain testimonies that the Delegation could not verify,
the first victims in terms of losses in human lives were seemingly
recorded within the youth wing of the ruling party. These allegations
indicate that there were also crisis victims within third-term activists and
supporters (real or perceived as such) turned those of the government
(real or perceived as such) resulting from the July 2015 elections. The
reported acts of violence were perpetrated by supporters of the camp
opposed to the third term, and then to the government.
123. Thus, according to various testimonies collected by the Delegation, the
persons killed and wounded, victims of cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, those whose property was destroyed and victims of other
abuses such as harassment and prohibition of movement were found
30
both within supporters of the third term and the government, and
opponents of the third term and the government.
124. Indeed, the Delegation was informed of the rape and very brutal
assassination of a certain Jacqueline Hakizimana, for belonging to the
youth wing of the ruling party. The Delegation also received information
on targeted attacks against politicians and important personalities of the
system supporting the authorities in power. This is the case especially of
the assassination, in an ambush on 2 August 2015, of General Adolphe
Nshimirimana, former assistant chief of staff and former Burundian
intelligence chief, and chargé de mission at the presidency, at the time of
his death.
125. The assassination of the former Burundian army chief of staff, Colonel
Jean Bikomaguon 15 August 2015 by armed individuals on a bike; and
the 11 September 2015 attempted attack perpetrated by a commando in
military uniforms against General Prime Niyongabo, the current chief of
staff of the Burundian army; are some examples to show that violence is
not the sole prerogative of authorities in power.
126. During its mission, the Delegation was also informed by the two top
officials of the national police, of the number of victims recorded within
their ranks. Thus, according to information shared with the Delegation,
there were, as of that day, about 39 police officers killed, and 318
wounded, including 9 permanently disabled, as a result of their wounds.
To all these recorded victims should be added the anonymous victims of
the consequences of the crisis.
•
Victims due to collateral damage from clashes between the
parties
127.
A certain category of victims cannot be classified in any of the two
opposing camps neither from the objective point of view nor based on
simple perception. These victims, found in all segments of the population,
exist just by opportunism on the part of opposing parties and certain
persons indulging in ordinary crime that has increased considerably with
the crisis. Others are victims for having been at the wrong place at the
wrong time.
128.
These cases were observed during grenade attacks in public places
such as bars, where simple passers-by are wounded or killed, armed
attacks and other criminal acts not having any link with the stakes of the
crisis, but which are encouraged by the latter, due to general insecurity and
easy access to weapons and other means for commission of crimes.
iii.
Perpetrators of those responsible for violations of human rights
31
•
Security forces and, particularly, the Burundi National Police
129. All persons contacted by the Delegation reported violations committed
by security forces, particularly those involving the Burundi National
Police (PNB), the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and, to a lesser
extent, the army. The SNR, on its part, is mentioned in cases of torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as well as cases of arbitrary
detentions and abductions.
130. According to interviews, the PNB was in the frontline in the violent
repression of demonstrations, and continues to commit violations of
human rights, such as infringements on physical integrity, arbitrary
arrests, summary executions, abductions and infringement on property
rights, etc. Two units of the PNB, namely the Police charged with
Protection of Institutions and the Judicial Police were identified as being
most active in the commission of violations.
131. As concerns the army, its role is still quite limited in the crisis, and
observers and victims accuse it of violations of human rights by
abstention, or by failing to protect the population. This accusation
certainly led to the abortive coup d’état, at the end of which there were a
considerable number of violations of human rights.
•
Auxiliaries of the Burundi National Police and /or Imbonerakure
132.
The Delegation had a lot of information according to which there are
auxiliaries within the PNB that committed violations of human rights. It also
had information that these auxiliaries came from the ranks of the ruling
party’s youth wing known as “Imbonerakure”.
133.
When these allegations were raised with ministers in charge of security
and the highest authorities of the police, the latter categorically refuted
them. However, being unable to verify these allegations, the Delegation
concluded that their persistence and previous reports on the matter pleaded
in favour of the veracity of the information received as to the existence of
elements within the PNB that are not regular members of the police force.
134.
Many testimonies corroborate the view according to which the ruling
party’s youth wing known as “Imbonerakure”, acts and moves in public as
a force with military discipline attitudes, and is responsible, according to the
population, for certain violations of human rights. In addition, the
Delegation also noted the formation of neighbourhood vigilante committees
and other similar groups by the ruling party’s youth wing and supporters of
the opposition, and which were involved in many irregular acts such as the
organization of check-points and security patrols in their various areas and
32
neighbourhoods. This leads to many abuses that have been attributed to
them. Reports indicate that the latter often carry out arrests or searches for
disarmament purposes, in conjunction with the regular police, under the
cover of police-population collaboration.
•
The Burundian Government and certain senior authorities
135. The government’s general obligation to protect under the African
Charter, imposes on it a general responsibility for violations that occurred
during the period subject to this fact-finding mission. Indeed, security,
peace, development and other indispensable elements for the preservation
and protection of human rights in a State are the latter’s primary
responsibility. Consequently, jurisprudence in the area of human rights
and, particularly that of the Commission, obliges “States to protect citizens
or persons within their jurisdictions against the harmful acts of third
parties. Thus, an act committed by a private person, and, therefore, not
directly attributable to the State can commit the latter’s responsibility, not
because of the act itself, but because of lack of due diligence to prevent the
violation or failure to take the necessary measures to provide
compensation to victims”31
136. Thus, the entire government and all senior authorities who had the
power and capacity to act to prevent violations of human rights, or to
ensure that the culprits are identified and punished with compensation to
victims, and failed to do so, are accomplices of the violations. The
Delegation identified calls for violence and intolerance against supporters
and advocates of the camp opposed to the government. These attitudes
that are not in line with appeasement and do not firmly condemn or
discourage the commission of violations of human rights, but manifestly
and subtly encourage them, commit the responsibility of these authorities
and State personalities.
137. The particular case of the Senate President who publicly called for the
repression and denunciation of persons opposed to the third term and the
regime, quite illustrates this state of affairs. In the crisis context prevailing
in Burundi, nobody should have acted and said something that could be
interpreted as condoning violations of human rights or calling for them to
be committed under whatever justification.
•
Demonstrators and youths of “opposition” neighbourhoods
138. The Delegation considers that the two groups are responsible for
certain violations of human rights, because, according to evidence, the
31 See the Commission’s position in Paper 245/02 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum / Zimbabwe
which itself took up jurisprudence in this direction from the Inter-American Human Rights Court in the
Velásquez-Rodríguez case.
33
youths who demonstrated against the third term are the same ones
controlling opposition neighbourhoods, where they impose their law.
139. Indeed, even though various instruments ratified by Burundi,
including the African Charter, guarantee the right to peaceful
demonstrations, these same instruments lay down conditions under which
they must be held and those that can justify their limitation by authorities,
one of them being the peaceful nature of the demonstration. So, when
demonstrators against the third term indulged in violence, authorities had
every right to put an end to it, so as to restore public order. By violently
opposing the security forces and causing damage to public and private
property, the demonstrators went beyond their right to demonstrate and
committed violations that constitute an offence.
140. In addition, following the evidence collected, the modus operandi of
certain demonstrators at the barricades that they raised revealed that they
had some military training. That is why, responding to the repression
from security forces, certain demonstrators behaved like real executioners
of the latter and all persons identified wrongly or rightly as opposed to
their demonstrations. It is true that certain demonstrators acted in selfdefence against the violence of the security forces. However, when
demonstrators go ahead to capture members of the security forces and
other persons, and subject them to acts of violence, the Rubicon is crossed
and these acts become violations of human rights.
141. By setting up self-defence committees as de facto replacement for the
police force, youths of “opposition” neighbourhoods started acting
illegally and all their acts are considered as such, especially when they
infringe on the fundamental rights of the population, like freedom of
movement, the right to security of the person, property rights and others.
As a reminder, a lot of evidence indicates that these youths are often
perpetrators of extortion, intimidation and other abuses in the
neighbourhoods under their control.
•
Unidentified armed groups or the embryonic rebellion
142. Many testimonies from various actors on the field confirm the
existence of more or less structured armed groups that form a developing
embryonic rebellion on Burundian territory. These groups, referred to by
the Burundian regime as “insurgents”, “terrorists” or “criminals” carry
out attacks against all symbols of the republic incarnated by the current
regime. They are suspected as perpetrators of the attacks carried out by
unidentified armed groups, often in military uniforms, against police
positions, the government’s political and military authorities, bars and
other public places. The weapons used are war weapons such as grenades
launched almost on a daily basis in the Burundian capital.
34
143. The Delegation was informed of several attacks said to be carried out
by these unidentified armed groups, including the simultaneous attacks of
three military camps on 10 and11 December 2015. These groups and
authorities are generally responsible for the heavy casualties of these two
days.
•
Certain political and military opponents, and opinion leaders
144. In this category, the Delegation includes perpetrators of violations of
human rights, all political opponents, and political and opinion leaders
that had an attitude or said something contrary to the third term through
violence and weapons. These attitudes and comments are likely to
encourage violence that leads to violations of human rights and other
abuses, and nothing can justify that these persons are beyond the
mechanism for determining responsibilities regarding these violations.
145. Indeed, even though they are, for the most part, outside the country,
political opponents and other opinion leaders continue to support the
possible overthrow of the regime by force. Thus, perpetrators of the 13
May 2015 failed coup d’état and all their supporters, who escaped the
arrests made by authorities following the coup, were guilty of violations of
human rights by this act, which led to victims and helped to worsen an
already precarious security situation. Thus, following the failed coup,
many powder magazines were emptied and there was generalized
circulation of weapons, with desertions of elements of the security forces
that joined the armed resistance by deliberate choice or by necessity, so as
to protect themselves from the hunt for presumed perpetrators of the coup
d’état.
146. The views and attitude of these persons betray their direct involvement
or their support to the on-going acts of violence in Burundi and which are
aimed at taking power by force. Consequently, the violations of human
rights ensuing from the acts of armed groups and others acting at their
direct or indirect instigation, must be attributed to them as well as to other
previously identified officials.
II.
Recommendations
147. The Delegation identified a number of urgent recommendations to be
implemented by various actors to immediately stop the violence, end
violations of human rights and other abuses, resolve the serious crisis
prevailing in Burundi, as well as create conditions for the return of lasting
and final peace in the country.
35
i.
•
To the opposing parties
To the Burundian Government and allies
− Stop immediately and without conditions, all forms of violence
and indiscriminate acts against those perceived as opposed to the
government in power;
− Take all necessary measures, in accordance with applicable
standards in this area to ensure the security of persons and
property all over Burundian territory and particularly in the parts
where insecurity is prevailing;
− Ensure that operations to secure and protect persons and property
comply with the principle of legality and standards enshrined in
national laws and international instruments binding on Burundi;
− Resume immediately and without conditions the mediation
process initiated by international partners including the East
African Community (EAC),the African Union (AU), the European
Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN);
− Take all necessary measures to create conditions of trust that
promote dialogue among the protagonists of the crisis;
− Establish and effectively operationalize a transitional justice
process that can establish the facts and responsibilities regarding
violations of human rights and other abuses committed during the
crisis;
− Fight against impunity by taking proceedings against presumed
perpetrators of all violations of human rights linked to the crisis;
− Establish a compensation mechanism for victims of violations of
human rights and other abuses linked to the crisis;
− Take all necessary measures to ensure the non-repetition of
violations of human rights and other abuses noted;
− Pay particular attention and provide specific protection against
violations of human rights to vulnerable groups such as women,
children and others, in collaboration with international partners;
− Collaborate fully with international partners such as the AU, the
UN, the EU, humanitarian organizations and others that provide
solutions in support to crisis resolution and cessation of violations
of human rights;
− Authorize a new deployment of human rights observers and AU
military experts, and collaborate fully with them by finalizing the
necessary legal framework for their effective operationalization
and in fine, authorize the deployment of the African Prevention
and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU),as decided by the
AU’s PSC;
− Ensure free and uninhibited access to workers of humanitarian
organizations operating in Burundi;
36
•
To Armed Groups
− Stop all acts of violence immediately and without preconditions;
− Renounce without preconditions violence as a means of
conquering political power or resistance to a disputed
government;
− Make available to the courts all members who have been guilty
of violations of human rights and other abuses during the crisis;
− Embark fully on on-going and future mediation or dialogue
processes aimed at finally resolving the crisis;
− Refrain from obstructing the activities of impartial local and
international partners aimed at providing support to the needy
population and helping to resolve the crisis;
•
To opposition political parties and allies
− Embark immediately and without preconditions on mediation
and dialogue processes to restore a climate of peace where
conquest of political power is in line with democratic rules;
− Stop supporting or using any warlike rhetoric or whose
interpretation could lead to acts of violence and violations of
human rights;
− Respect the principle of legality and base all actions within the
legal frameworks defined by Burundian laws in accordance
with international standards, while respecting the rule of law in
challenging all true or supposed irregularities within the
Burundian legal and political frameworks;
− Refrain from obstructing the activities of impartial local and
international partners aimed at providing support to the needy
population and helping to resolve the crisis;
•
To the Burundian civil society
− Show proof of real independence to avoid being seen as an ally
of one or the other opposing parties;
− Support through sensitization, advocacy and other appropriate
means the efforts of mediation and dialogue processes aimed at
restoring final and lasting peace in Burundi ;
− Contribute to the establishment of facts and the determination
of responsibilities regarding violations of human rights and
other abuses through investigations and an impartial
documentation of cases of violation ;
− Support and be at the heart of an equidistant synergy of
opposing parties, in order to be a reliable facilitator for all the
parties ;
37
•
To Burundian media organs
− Limit themselves strictly to their role while complying with
internationally recognized ethical and professional rules;
− Refrain from allying with one or the other of the opposing
parties and contribute to efforts aimed at settling the conflict
through mediation and dialogue;
− Refrain from being used as a channel through which hate
speech tinged with violence is conveyed by opposing parties or
all other actors involved;
− Position themselves as harbingers of peace and democracy by
disseminating messages in this direction, through education and
sensitization of the population;
− Refrain from obstructing the activities of impartial local and
international partners aimed at providing support to the needy
population and helping to resolve the crisis;
•
To the Ugandan mediation mandated by the East African
Community
− Do everything to plead to the opposing parties to immediately
stop the prevailing violence and violations of human rights;
− Continue and increase the efforts and consultations initiated to
bring the opposing parties together so as to begin dialogue and
finalize an agreement aimed at finally resolving the crisis;
− Ask for all the necessary assistance and pressure at the local
level and from international partners, so as to define the crisis
exit plan in collaboration with all actors involved in the crisis.
•
To the East African Community
− Fully support the mediation that it has initiated by allocating the
human, financial and logistical resources and other necessary
means for the success of this mission;
− Begin internal consultations with its members, so as to have a
single and consensual position on the Burundi crisis with a view
to speaking with one single and same voice on this matter;
− Establish binding measures aimed at limiting bad faith from
certain actors in the conflict who would try to undermine the
mediation process and the finalization of a crisis exit agreement
in Burundi;
•
To the African Union
− Make all the necessary efforts in collaboration with international and
local partners, including the UN, the EU, the EAC, the Burundian
38
Government and non-State local actors, to immediately stop the
violence and violations of human rights in Burundi; and particularly:
✓ Put pressure on the actors using violence as a means of
expressing their demands and conquering power, to
immediately renounce all acts of violence ;
✓ Put pressure on the Burundian Government to stop using
excessive and indiscriminate force in its sovereign mission of
protecting persons and property in Burundi ;
✓ Increase the number of human rights observers and military
experts and make available to them all the necessary means
for the effective conduct of their mission ;
✓ Negotiate with the Burundian Government and all the
parties concerned for MAPROBU to be effectively deployed
in Burundi and to carry out its mission, as decided by the
PSC;
✓ Prepare several contingency plans to prevent a possible
sudden and generalized worsening of the crisis, with a
possible open conflict where the civilian population would
be at great risk;
✓ Refer serious cases of violations of human rights to existing
mechanisms or those to be established to sanction the
perpetrators of these violations and compensate for damage
caused to victims ;
− Unreservedly support ongoing and future mediation and dialogue
initiatives by providing them with diplomatic, human, logistical,
financial, technical and other means;
− Consult constantly with international partners like the UN, the EU and
others so as to mobilize the necessary resources and means to resolve
the Burundian conflict from its roots;
•
To other international partners (UN, EU, humanitarian organizations
and others)
− Support African efforts and initiatives to resolve the crisis by
coordinating their actions with ongoing or future ones at the African
level.
39