251/02 : Lawyers of Human Rights / Swaziland
Summary of Facts
1. The Complainant is Lawyers for Human Rights, a human rights NGO based in Swaziland.
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2. The complaint was received at the Secretariat of the [African] Commission on 3 June 2002 and is
against the Kingdom of Swaziland which is a party to the African Charter.
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3. The Complainant states that the Kingdom of Swaziland gained independence on 6 September
1968 under the Swaziland Independence Constitution Order, Act No. 50 of 1968. The 1968
Constitution enshrined several fundamental principles of democratic governance such as the
supremacy of the Constitution and separation of powers and clearly laid down procedures for
amending the Constitution.
4. The 1968 Constitution also provided for a justiciable Bill of Rights which secured the protection of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of association, expression and
assembly.
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5. The Complainant alleges that on 12 April 1973, King Sobhuza I issued the King’s Proclamation to
the Nation No. 12 of 1973 whereby he declared that he had assumed supreme power in the Kingdom
of Swaziland and that all legislative, executive and judicial power vested in him. In addition, he
repealed the democratic Constitution of Swaziland that was enacted in 1968.
6. It is alleged that the King’s Proclamation resulted in the loss of the protections afforded to the
Swazi people under the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, which effectively incorporated the rights ensured
by the African Charter.
7. According to the communication, the provisions of the Proclamation outlawing political parties
violate the Swazi people’s freedom of association, expression and assembly, thereby diminishing the
rights, duties, and freedoms of the Swazi people that are enshrined in the African Charter.
8. Furthermore, it is alleged that the Swazi people do not possess effective judicial remedies because
the King retains the power to overturn all court decisions, thereby removing any meaningful legal
avenue for redress.
Complaint
9. The Complainant alleges that the following articles of the African Charter have been violated:
Articles 1, 7, 10, 11, 13 and26.
Procedure
10. At its 32
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Ordinary Session, the African Commission decided to be seized of the communication.
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11. On 30 October 2002, the Secretariat informed the parties of the decision of the African
Commission and requested them to transmit their written submissions on admissibility within a period
of [three] (3) months.
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12. At its 33 Ordinary Session held in Niamey, Niger from 15 to 29 May 2003, the African
Commission examined the communication and decided to defer its consideration on admissibility to
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the 34 Ordinary Session.
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13. 0n 10 June 2003, the Secretariat of the African Commission wrote informing the parties to the
communication of the African Commission’s decision and reminded them to forward their submissions
on admissibility within [two] 2 months.
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14. During its deliberations at the 34 Ordinary Session held from 6 to 20 November 2003 in
Banjul, The Gambia, the African Commission however decided to defer consideration of the
communication.
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15. On 4 December 2003, the parties to the communication were informed of the decision of the
African Commission and requested the parties to forward their written submissions on admissibility
within [two] 2 months.
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16. At the 35 Ordinary Session held from 21 May to 4 June 2004 in Banjul, The Gambia, the
Complainant made oral submissions before the African Commission. The African Commission
considered the communication and declared it admissible.
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17. At its 36 Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal from 23 November to 7 December 2004,
the African Commission deferred consideration on the merits of the communication to give the
Respondent State one more chance to makes its submissions.
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18. At its 37 Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 27 April to 11 May 2005, the
African Commission considered the communication [and] took a decision on the merits thereof.
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Admissibility
19. The African Commission was seized with the present communication at its 32nd Ordinary
Session which was held in Banjul, The Gambia from 17th to 23rd October 2002. The Respondent
State has since been requested numerous times to forward its submissions on admissibility but to no
avail. The African Commission will therefore proceed to deal with this matter on admissibility based on
the facts presented by the Complainant.
20. Article 56 of the African Charter governs admissibility of communications brought before the
African Commission in accordance with Article 55 of the African Charter. All of the conditions of this
article are met by the present communication except Article 56.5, which merits special attention in
determining the admissibility of this communication.
21. 56(5)of the African Charter provides:
“Communications...received by the African Commission shall be considered if they: Article 56.5 are
sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly
prolonged.”
22. The rule requiring the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of the presentation of a
communication before the African Commission is premised on the principle that the Respondent State
must first have an opportunity to redress by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic
legal system, the wrong alleged to have been done to the individual(s).
23. The Complainant submits that as a result of the King’s Proclamation to the Nation No. 12 of 1973,
the written and democratic Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland enacted in 1968 containing a Bill
of Rights was repealed. Furthermore, the Proclamation prohibited the Courts of the Kingdom of
Swaziland from enquiring into the validity of the Proclamation or any acts undertaken in accordance
with the Proclamation.
24. The Complainant indicates that under the Proclamation, the King assumes supreme power in the
Kingdom and judicial power is vested in him and he retains the power to overturn all court decisions,
thereby removing any meaningful legal avenue for redress. The complainant quotes the case
of Professor Dlamini v The King to illustrate instances where the King has exercised his power to
undermine 34 decisions of the courts. In that case, the Court of Appeal overturned the Non-Bailable
Offences Order of 1993, which ousted the courts’ jurisdiction to entertain bail applications. Following
the decision of the Court of Appeal, the King issued a Decree, No. 2 of 2001, reinstating the Non
Bailable Offences Order. However, due to international pressure, the King later repealed aspects of
the reinstated Non Bailable Offenses Order by Decree No. 3 of 2001.
25. Therefore the Complainant argues they cannot exhaust domestic remedies because they are
unavailable by virtue of the Proclamation and even where a matter could be instituted and won in the
courts of Swaziland, it would not constitute a meaningful, durable remedy because the King would
nullify such legal victory.
26. The Complainant provides all the Proclamations made by the King and after perusing the
Proclamations, the African Commission notes that nowhere in all the Proclamations is there an ouster
clause to the effect that the Courts of the Kingdom of Swaziland are prohibited from enquiring into the
validity of the Proclamation or any acts undertaken in accordance with the Proclamation.
27. The African Commission has considered this matter and realises that for the past 31 years the
Kingdom of Swaziland has had no Constitution. Furthermore, the complainant has presented the
African Commission with information demonstrating that the King is prepared to utilise the judicial
power vested in him to overturn court decisions. As such, the African Commission believes that taking
into consideration the general context within which the judiciary in Swaziland is operating and the
challenges that they have been faced with especially in the recent past, any remedies that could have
been utilised with respect to the present communication would have likely been temporary. In other
words, the African Commission is of the view that the likelihood of the complainant succeeding in
obtaining a remedy that would redress the situation complained of in this matter is so minimal as to
render it unavailable and therefore ineffective. For the reasons stated herein above, the African
Commission declares this communication admissible.
Merits
Submission from the Complainant
28. The Complainant submits that the Kingdom of Swaziland signed the African Charter in 1991. The
significance of the signing is that the Kingdom declared an intention to be bound by the Charter. The
Complainant submits further that on 15 of September 1995, the Kingdom of Swaziland then ratified the
Charter and by ratifying the Charter, the Kingdom declared its final formal intention and declaration to
be bound by the provisions of the Charter. Formal agreements, particularly unilateral agreements [sic],
normally require ratification in addition to the signature. This requires the representative of the State
subsequently to endorse the earlier signature. This requires the representative of the state
subsequently to endorse the earlier signature. This provides the state with an opportunity to reconsider
its decision to be bound by the treaty, and, if necessary, to effect changes to its own law to enable it to
fulfil its obligation under the treaty.
29. The Complainant notes that the Kingdom of Swaziland had ample time between 1991 and 1995
to consider whether or not to formally agree to be bound by the [African] Charter or to change its laws
to fulfil its obligations in 1995.
30. The Complainant notes that the Respondent State has violated Article 1 of the African Charter as
the latter imposes an obligation on member states of the African Union to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to the rights, duties and obligations enshrined therein, noting the African
Commission’s decision in [i] communication 147/95 and 149/96 where the African Commission found
that: Article 1 gives the Charter the legally binding character always attributed to international treaties
of this sort. Therefore a violation of any provision of the Charter automatically means a violation
of Article 1. If a State Party to the Charter fails to recognise the provisions of the same, there is no
doubt that it is in violation of this Article. Its violation, therefore, goes to the root of the Charter.
31. The Complainant states further that the African Commission found that the obligation
under Article 1 commences at ratification and that ratification implies that the State party must also
take pre-emptive steps to prevent human rights violations. According to the Complainant, it goes
without saying that the African Commission must declare the Proclamation to be in violation of Article
1.
32. The Complainant also alleges violation of Article 7 of the African Charter noting that the
Proclamation vests all powers of State to the King, including judicial powers and the authority to
appoint and remove judges which necessitates the conclusion that Courts are not independent,
especially in view of Decree No. 3 [of] 2001. This Decree clearly ousts the courts’ jurisdiction to grant
bail on matters listed in the schedule, which schedule may be amended from time to time outside
Parliament. The Complainant made reference to the African Commission’s decision in [i]
communication 60/91, where it was stated that:
Jurisdiction has thus been transferred from the normal courts to a tribunal chiefly composed of
persons belonging to the executive branch that passed the Robbery and Firearms Decree, whose
members do not necessarily possess any legal expertise. Article 7.1.d of the African Charter requires
courts or tribunal to be impartial. Regardless of the character of the individual members of such
tribunals, its composition alone creates the appearance, if not lack, of impartiality.
33. According to the Complainant, Decree No. 3 of 2001 is in violation of Article 7, particularly Article
7.1.d and the African Commission is urged to find as such.
34. The Complainant also alleges violation of Article 10 and alleges that Sections 11, 12 and 13 of
the Proclamation in very clear terms abolish and prohibit the existence and the formation of political
parties or organisations of a similar nature. In this regard, the Complainant quotes
communication 225/98 and the African Commission’s Resolution on the Right to Freedom of
Association which provides that;
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the competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and international standards;
in regulating the use of this right, the competent authorities should not enact provisions which
would limit the exercise of this freedom;
the regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association should be consistent with
state’s obligations under the African Charter.
35. The [African] Commission then concluded that the Nigerian Government’s acts constituted a
violation of Article 10 of the African Charter. Accordingly, this Resolution equally applies to the
Kingdom of Swaziland, and thus Swaziland is in violation. With regards to allegations of violation
of Article 11, the Complainant argues that the King’s Proclamation does not only prohibit the right to
associate but also the right to assemble peacefully and adds that the right to associate cannot be
divorced from the right to assembly freely and peacefully. In this regard the Complainant cites the
African Commission’s decision in communications 147/95 and 149/96 where it stated that the [African]
Commission in its [i] Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association had also reiterated that the
regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association should be consisted [sic] with States
obligations under the African Charter. This principle does not apply to freedom of association alone but
also to all other rights and freedoms enshrined in the [African] Charter, including, the right to freedom
of assembly.
36. The complainant also alleged violation of Article 13 of the African Charter and stated that Section
8 of King’s Proclamation of 1981 provides that “The provisions of section 11 and 12 of the King’s
Proclamation of the 12th April, 1973 shall not be applicable to the Tinkundla which are hereby
declared and recognised as centres for meetings of the nation” . According to the Complainant the
import of this section is that citizens can only participate in issues of governance only within structures
of the present system, which does not allow free association and assembly, expression and
conscience (the TinkhundlaSystem of Government). In this regard, the Complainant refers to the
[African] Commission’s decision in [i] communication --147.95-146.96" data-st_id="0"> 147/95 and
146/96 Sir Dawda Jawara/The Gambia where it stated that:
“the imposition of the ban on former Ministers and Members of Parliament is in contravention of their
rights to participate freely in the government of their country provided for under Article 13.1 of the
Charter. Also the ban on political parties is a violation of the Complainants rights to freedom of
association guaranteed under Article 10.1 of the Charter.”
37. And communication 211/98 which provides that the [African] Charter must be interpreted
holistically and all clauses must reinforce each other. The purpose or effect of any limitation must also
be examined, as the limitation of the right cannot be used to subvert rights already enjoyed.
Justification, therefore cannot be derived solely from popular will as such, cannot be used to limit the
responsibilities of State parties in terms of the [African] Charter.
38. The Complainant alleges further a violation of Article 26 of the African Charter noting that a
violation of Article 7 is relevant to Article 26 and in this regard makes reference to communication
52/91[sic] , communication 54/91[, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 210/98], communication 61/91
[sic] , and communication 129/94 in which the African Commission found that whileArticle 7 focuses on
the individual’s right to be heard, Article 26 speaks of the institutions which are essential to give
meaning and content to that right. This article clearly envisions the protection of the Courts which have
traditionally been the bastion of protection of the individual’s rights against the abuses of state power.
39. The complainant noted further that it is beyond doubt that the vesting of judicial powers in the
person of the King undermines the authority and independence of the Courts, more so because the
King with his legislative powers can easily water down the decision of the Courts as was the case in
the judgment of Professor Dlamini v The King, Appeal Case No. 42/2000, where the King by Decree
No. 2 of 2001 overturned the Court of Appeal judgment by reinstating the Non-Bailable Offences Order
which had been declared unconstitutional.
40. The Complainant prays the African Commission to:
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finds the King’s Proclamation of 12th April 1973 to be in violation of the African Charter; and
recommend and mandate strongly the Kingdom of Swaziland to take constitutional measures
forthwith to give effect to all the provisions of the African Charter, specifically Articles 1,Article
7, Article 10,Article 11,Article 13 and Article 26 thereof.
Commission’s decision on the merits
41. ln making this decision on the merits, the African Commission would like to point out that it is
disappointed with the lack of cooperation from the Respondent State. The decision on the merits was
taken without any response from the State. As a matter of fact, since the communication was
submitted to the [African] Commission and in spite several correspondences to the [Respondent]
State, there hasn’t been any response from the latter on the matter. Under such circumstances, the
[African] Commission is left with no other option than to take a decision based on the information at its
disposal.
42. It must be stated however that, by relying on the information provided by the Complainant, the
[African] Commission did not rush into making a decision. The [African] Commission analysed each
allegation made and established the veracity thereof.
43. A preliminary matter that has to be addressed by the African Commission is the competence of
the commission to entertain allegations of human rights violations that took place before the adoption
of the [African] Charter or even its coming into force. In making this determination the [African]
Commission has to differentiate between allegations that are no longer being perpetrated and
violations that are ongoing.
44. ln case of the former, that is, violations that occurred before the coming into force of the [African]
Charter but which are no longer or which stopped before the coming into force of the [African] Charter,
the [African] Commission has no competence to entertain them. The events which occurred before the
date of ratification of the [African] Charter are therefore outside the [African] Commission’s
competence rationae temporis . The [African] Commission is only competent ratione temporis to
consider events which happened after that date or, if they happened before then, constitute a violation
continuing after that date.
45. ln the present communication, the violations are said to have started in 1973 following the
Proclamation by the King, that is, prior to the coming into force of the African Charter and continued
after the coming into force of the [African] Charter through when the Respondent State ratified the
[African] Charter and is still ongoing to date. The [African] Commission therefore has the competence
to deal with the communication.
46. The [African] Commission has competence ratione loci to examine the case because the petition
alleges violations of rights protected by the African Charter, which have taken place within the territory
of a State Party to that Charter. It has competence ratione materiae as the petition alleges violations of
human rights protected by the [African] Charter, and lastly it has competence ratione temporis as the
facts alleged in the petition took place when the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights
established in the [African] Charter was in force for the Kingdom of Swaziland. Given that Swaziland
signed the [African] Charter in 1991 and later ratified [it] on 15 September 1995, it is clear that the
alleged events continue to be perpetrated when the [Respondent] State became [sic] under the
obligation to respect and safeguard all rights enshrined in the [African] Charter, giving the [African]
Commission rationae temporis competence.
47. The two stages of signature and ratification of an international treaty provides states with the
opportunity to take steps to ensure that they make the necessary domestic arrangements to ensure
that by the time they ratify a treaty the latter is in conformity with their domestic law. When ratifying the
[African] Charter, the Respondent State was aware of the violation complaint [sic] of and had the
obligation to take all the necessary steps to comply with its obligations under Article 1 of the [African]
Charter - to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights and freedoms in the
[African] Charter.
48. From the above, it is the [African] Commission’s opinion that it is competent to deal with the
matter before it.
49. Having determined that it is competent to deal with the matter, the [African] Commission will now
proceed to examine each of the rights alleged to have been violated by the Respondent State.
50. The complainant argues that by ratifying the African Charter and not adopting legislative and
other measures to bring the 1973 Proclamation in conformity with the [African] Charter, the
Respondent State has violated Article 1 of the African Charter. The use of the terms ‘other measures’
in Article 1 provides State Parties with a wide choice of measures to use to deal with human rights
problems. In the present situation when a Decree has been passed by the Head of State abrogating
the Constitution, it was incumbent on the same Head of State and other relevant institutions in the
country to demonstrate good faith and either reinstate the Constitution or amend the Decree to bring it
in conformity with the [African] Charter provisions during or after ratification.
51. ln the opinion of the [African] Commission, by ratifying the [African] Charter without at the same
time taking appropriate measures to bring domestic laws in conformity with it, the Respondent State’s
action defeated the very object and spirit of the [African] Charter and thus violating Article 1 thereof.
52. The complainant also alleges violation of Article 7 of the [African] Charter stating that the
Proclamation vests all powers of State to the King, including judicial powers and the authority to
appoint and remove judges and Decree No. 3/2001 which ousts the courts’ jurisdiction to grant bail on
matters listed in the schedule. According to the complainant this illustrates that courts
are not independent.
53. Article 7 of the African Charter provides for fair trial guarantees - safeguards to ensure that any
person accused of an offence is given a fair hearing. In its Resolution on Fair Trial adopted at its 11th
Ordinary Session, in Tunis, Tunisia, from 2nd to 9th March 1992, the African Commission held that the
right to fair trial includes, among other things, the right to be heard, the right of an arrested person to
be informed at the time of arrest in a language he/she understands, of the reason for the arrest and to
be informed promptly of any charges against them, the right of arrested or detained persons to be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and be
tried within a reasonable time or be released, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a
competent court. 53. In the present communication, the King’s Proclamation clearly outlaws the
formation of political parties or any similar structure. Political parties are one means through which
citizens can participate in governance either directly or through elected representatives of their choice.
By prohibiting the formation of political parties, the King’s Proclamation seriously undermined the
ability of the Swaziland [sic] people to participate in the government of their country and thus
violated Article 13 of the [African] Charter.
54. In the present communication the Proclamation of 1973 and the Decree of 2001 vested judicial
power in the King and ousted the jurisdiction of the court on certain matters. The acts of vesting
judicial power in the King or ousting the jurisdiction of the courts on certain matters in themselves do
not only constitute a violation of the right to fair trial as guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, but also
tend to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
55. Article 26 of the [African] Charter provides that States Parties shall have the duty to guarantee
the independence of the courts. Article 1 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary states that:
the independence of the Judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution
or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe
the independence of judiciary.
Article 11 of the same Principles states that:
the term of office of judges, their independence, security ...shall be adequately secured by law.
Article 18 provides that:
“Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that
renders them unfit to discharge their duties.”
Article 30of the International Bar Association (IBA)’s Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence also guarantees that:
“A Judge shall not be subject to removal unless, by reason of a criminal act or through gross or
repeated neglect or physical or mental incapacity, he has shown himself manifestly unfit to hold the
position of judge”
And Article 1(b) states that
“Personal independence means that the terms and conditions of judicial service are adequately
secured so as to ensure that individual judges are not subject to executive control.”
56. By entrusting all judicial powers to the Head of State with powers to remove judges, the
Proclamation of 1973 seriously undermines the independence of the judiciary in Swaziland. The
main raison d’être of the principle of separation of powers is to ensure that no organ of government
becomes too powerful and abuses its power. The separation of power amongst the three organs of
government - executive, legislature and judiciary - ensure checks and balances against excesses from
any of them. By concentrating the powers of all three government structures into one person, the
doctrine of separation of power undermines [sic] and is subject to abuse.
57. In its Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening on the Independence of the
Judiciary adopted at its 19th Ordinary Session held from 26th March to 4th April 1996 at
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the African Commission “recognised the need for African countries to
have a strong and independent judiciary enjoying the confidence of the people for sustainable
democracy and development” . The [African] Commission then “urged all State Parties to the Charter
to repeal all their legislation which are inconsistent with the principles of respect of the independence
of the judiciary, especially with regard to the appointment and posting of judges and to refrain from
taking any action which may threaten directly or indirectly the independence and the security of judges
and magistrates” .
58. Clearly, retaining a law which vests all judicial powers in the Head of State with possibility of
hiring and firing judges directly threatens the independence and security of judges and the judiciary as
a whole. The Proclamation of 1973, to the extent that it allows the Head of State to dismiss judges and
exercise judicial power is in violation of Article 26 of the African Charter.
59. With regards to allegation of violation of Articles 10 and Article 11, the Complainant submits that
the Proclamation of 1973 abolishes and prohibits the existence and the formation of political parties or
organisations of a similar nature and that the Proclamation also violates Article 11; the right to
assemble peacefully as the right to associate cannot be divorced from
the right to assembly freely and peacefully.
60. Article 10 of the African Charter provides that “every individual shall have the right to free
association provided that he abides by the law”. And Article 11 provides that “every individual shall
have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to
necessary restrictions provided for by law...” . In communication 225/98 the African Commission,
quoting its Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association held that the regulation of the exercise
of the right to freedom of association should be consistent with state’s obligations under the African
Charter and in regulating the use of this right, the competent authorities should not enact provisions
which would limit the exercise of this freedom. That the competent authorities should not override
constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and
international standards. The [African] Commission reiterated this in communications 147/95 and
149/96and concluded that this principle does not apply to freedom of association alone but also to all
other rights and freedoms enshrined in the [African] Charter, including, the right to freedom of
assembly.
61. Admittedly, the Proclamation restricting the enjoyment of these rights was enacted prior to the
coming into effect of the [African] Charter. However, the Respondent State had an obligation to ensure
that the Proclamation conforms to the [African] Charter when it ratified the latter in 1995. By ratifying
the [African] Charter without taking appropriate steps to bring its laws in line with the same, the African
Commission is of the opinion that the State has not complied with its obligations under Article 1 of the
[African] Charter and in failing to comply with the said duty, the prohibition on the establishment of
political parties under the Proclamation remained effective and consequently restricted the enjoyment
of the right to freedom of association and assembly of its citizens. The [African] Commission therefore
finds the State to have violated these two articles by virtue of the 1973 Proclamation.
62. The complainant also alleges violation of Article 13 of the African Charter claiming that the King’s
Proclamation of 1973 restricted participation of citizens in governance as according to the complainant
the import of Sections 11 and 12 of the Proclamation is that citizens can only participate in issues of
governance only within structures of the Tinkhundla . Incommunications 147/95 and 146/96 Sir Dawda
Jawara/The Gambia the [African] Commission held that the imposition of the ban on former Ministers
and Members of Parliament is in contravention of their rights to participate freely in the government of
their country provided for under Article 13.1 of the [African] Charter. Also the ban on political parties is
a violation of the complainant’s right to freedom of association guaranteed under Article 10.1 of the
[African] Charter.
Holding
From the above reasoning, the African Commission is of the view that the Kingdom of Swaziland by its
Proclamation of 1973 and the subsequent Decree No. 3 of 2001 violated Articles
1, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 26 of the African Charter.
The [African] Commission hereby recommends as follows:
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that the Proclamation and the Decree be brought in conformity with the provisions of the
African Charter;
that the State engages with other stakeholders, including members of civil society in the
conception and drafting of the New Constitution; and
that the Kingdom of Swaziland should inform the African Commission in writing within six
months on the measures it has taken to implement the above recommendations.
Adopted by the African Commission at its 37th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, from
27th April to 11th May 2005.