Decisions on Communications

Communication 401-11 Hawa Abdallah v Sudan

Communication 401-11 Hawa Abdallah v Sudan.pdf
UNION AFRICAINE AFRICAN UNION African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights I® UNIAO AFRICANA Commission Africaine des Droits de I'Homme & des Peuples 31 Bijilo Annex Layout. Kombo North District, Western Region,P. O. Box 673, Banjul, TheGambia Tel: (220) 4410505/4410506; Fax: (220) 4410504 E-mail: au-baniuKc&.africa-union.orq; Web www.achpr.org Communication 401/11 Hawa Abdallah (represented by African Center for Justice and Peace Studies) • The Sudan Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during the 1f'Exra-Ordmary Session, from the 19 to 28 February 2015 Banjul, The Gambia •" Hon. Commissioner KAYXTESI Zainabo Syivie Chairperson ofthe African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Kb.Dr. Mary H iboreke ' 'Secretary to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Communication 401/11 - Hawa Abdallah (represented by African Center for Justice and Peace Studies) v The Sudan Summary of the Complaint 1. The Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Secretariat) received a Complaint on 21 June 2011, from the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (the Author), a human rights organization registered in Uganda and acting on behalf of Ms. Hawa Abdallah (the Complainant). 2. The Communication is submitted against the Republic of the Sudan (the Respondent State) State Party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) on behalf of the above named Complainant. 3. The Author alleges that Ms. Hawa Abdallah, a Darfurian Community activist and translator for the United Nations-Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), was arrested on Friday, 06 May 2011 at her home at the Abu Shouk Internally Displaced Persons Camp by officers of the Sudanese National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), and briefly detained in El-Fashir before being transferred to Khartoum on 8 May 2011. 4. The Author further alleges that on the day of her transfer to Khartoum, the state-owned media outlet, SUNA, published an article accusing the Complainant of attempting to convert children in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps into Christianity as part of a wider conversion effort (in spite of the fact that the Complainant herself is Muslim), and of having links to an armed Darfurian militia and engaging in a wide range of other unlawful activities. 5. The Author submits that although the Complainant has not yet been officially charged, the severity of the accusations leveled against her in the media and by the authorities, including the capital crime of apostasy, suggests the vehemence with which the authorities were pursuing the matter. The release of a staged photograph alongside a statement by SUNA, according to the Author, underlines this apprehension. 6. The photograph released by SUNA to accompany their story on 8 May 2011 depicted Ms. Addallah posing with a bible and an identification card and showing visible signs of fatigue and what appeared to be bruises on her face. The Author contends that it is
highly unlikely that a Muslim woman would pose with these items especially in a country where apostasy is so severely criminalized; hence it concludes the photograph was forcibly posed. Though it is unclear when exactly the picture was taken, the Author maintains that it raises serious apprehensions about the likelihood of the Complainant being subjected to treatment that violates the African Charter during her detention. 7. The Author states that its concerns are heightened by information that the Complainant was previously tortured in NISS custody. In April 2009, she was detained in El-Fashir for six days after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudan's President, Omar Al Bashir. At that time, she was accused of passing information about the Government's activities to UN AMID and the ICC and of supporting a Darfurian rebel group, but she was ultimately released without charge. She subsequently received threatening phone calls from individuals claiming to be NISS officials who told her that the next time she was arrested, she would be killed. 8. The Author avers that it has received and reviewed reports further to interviews with the Complainant about the above period of detention. In these reports, according to the Author, the Complainant describes having been systematically beaten, whipped and deprived of sleep, as well as being forced to stand in painful positions for hours at a time. She was repeatedly called a prostitute and a spy and threatened with rape as well as rape of her mother. Another prisoner detained in the cell next to her who had been interviewed by the Author confirmed that he heard the Complainant crying for six nights in a row. 9. The Author states that the Complainant has not been allowed access to her family or a lawyer since she was detained despite repeated requests to the authorities. This was in contravention of the Sudanese National Security Act, Article 5 of which permits family visits. The detention was further in violation of the Status of Forces Agreement between UNAMID and Sudan. She has not been charged with any crime since her arrest in May 2011. 10. It is submitted by the Author that the Complainant is in danger of being subjected to torture, and indeed may already have been so subjected. As a matter of particular urgency, the Author seeks consideration by the Commission of a request for provisional measures calling on Sudan to refrain from exposing Ms. Abdallah to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, in order to prevent irreparable harm being visited on her.
Articles of the African Charter alleged to have been violated 11. The Author alleges violation of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 12 and 16 of the African Charter Procedure 12. The Secretariat of the African Commission received the Complaint by email on 21 June 2011. 13. The Commission was seized of the Communication during the 10th Extra-Ordinary Session held from 6 to 9 August 2012 in Banjul, The Gambia. The Author was informed and requested to submit on admissibility. The Communication was also brought to the attention of the Respondent State. The request for provisional measures was not granted. 14. The Communication was subsequently deferred during the 50th and 51st Sessions pending submission of the Author's observations on Admissibility. 15. On 12 December 2012, the Author's submissions on Admissibility were received at the Secretariat which acknowledged receipt of same on 8 January 2013. The submissions were forwarded to the Respondent State by Note Verbale on the same day and it was requested to submit its observations in accordance with Rule 105 (2) of the Commission's Rules. 16. On 3 March 2013, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale from the Respondent State that it had not been availed ofthe original complaint and could therefore not respond to the Complainant's submissions. The Respondent State's Submissions on Admissibility were received at the Secretariat on 18 June 2013. 17. The Communication was declared admissible at the 54th Ordinary Session of the Commission held from 22 November to 05 November 2013 in Banjul, The Gambia. The parties were informed of the Commission's decisions and the Author was requested to submit on the Merits.
18. On 31 January 2014, the Author requested for an extension of time within which to submit. The request was granted and the Author was informed by letter dated 30 January 2014. 19. On 31 March 2014, the Author's submissions on the Merits were received at the Secretariat which forwarded same to the Respondent State by Note Verbale of April 01 2014 requesting for its observations on the said submissions. 20. The Communication was subsequently deferred pending the Respondent State's observations. The Author's Submissions on Admissibility 21. The Author submits that all the Admissibility requirements under Article 56 of the Charter have been complied with. 22. With respect to the exhaustion of local remedies in particular, the Author explains that the absence of available, effective and sufficient remedies for torture in Sudan does not warrant them to exhaust the remedies for purposes of Admissibility. The Author points out that it is almost impossible both as a matter of law and practice, to seek redress for torture or unlawful detention by officials of the NISS in Sudan, despite the widespread and numerous allegations which have been documented by various international and national human rights organizations. 23. The Author claims that there are no effective modalities for lodging complaints before the authorities in situations of NISS detention. Key aspects of the National Security Act 2010 (NISS Act 2010), under which the Complainant was held, are incompatible with fundamental guarantees under articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Charter, and do not provide effective remedies for the violations alleged. They note that the NISS Act 2010, for example, does not require specification of the grounds for arrest and detention, provides no access to a lawyer during any point of the detention —which can be up to 45 days, or longer depending on the circumstances —and contains no provisions for judicial supervision during the period mentioned above like the right to habeas corpus. In
fact in addition to detention for up to 45 days without judicial review, a person may be detained for an additional three months if sanctioned by the National Security Council.1 24. Secondly, the Author points out that there is no individual right of action available which would permit a complainant to request the Prosecution Attorney to exercise the proprio motu powers which he does have under Article 51 (8) of the Act to inspect places of detention. It is submitted that even if such a review was initiated, and a detainee was able to lodge a complaint directly with the inspecting Attorney, it is unlikely to be pursued. 25. Thirdly, the Author notes that neither the Criminal Procedure Act of 1991 nor the National Security Forces Act of 1999, nor any other legislation, stipulate a duty on the part of the authorities to commence an investigation upon receiving notice of an allegation of torture or following a complaint of torture. There is no explicit right or established procedure or precedent of using mandamus or other remedies to compel the Sudanese authorities to commence an investigation. 26. Fourthly, the Author contends that even if such an investigation is indeed commenced, proceeding against a suspect face significant additional hurdles. They note that in its report adopted by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council in October 2009 the AU High Level Panel on Darfur noted with "particular concern" the existence of "immunities from criminal processes that are enjoyed by members of the Security Forces and which derive from legislation, as well as the exercise of powers conferred upon the President." 27. According to the Author, no authority other than the Director of the NISS can lift the immunities granted to NISS officials. Even if such a request to the Director is made, there are no procedures available before Sudanese courts which can compel the Director to make a decision on such a request, order a review of a decision not to lift immunities, or directhim to respond in the affirmative. A decision by the Director of the NISS to lift 1See, for example, the decision oftheSudanese Constitutional Court in Alam Eldeen AbduElgani and others vs. the NISS, issued the 8thJuly, 2007, confirming the impossibility of review, inter alia, ofthe period of detention of the applicant. The Court declared that it would notintervene in the matter as the authors were detained according to the Articles 6 and 30of the NISS Act1999 and therefore the periodof detentionstipulated in article 31 (2) (b) could not be subject to scrutiny.
immunities is therefore ultimately an administrative or political one, rather than a judicial one. The Author avers that the constitutionality of these immunities was upheld by the Constitutional Court in 2008 in the case of Farouq Mohamed Ibrahim al Nour vs Government of Sudan.2 28. The Author submits that in addition to these substantive legal and procedural barriers, as a matter of practice, it is not aware of any prosecution - let alone conviction —of a member of the NISS for torture. It knows of no instance in which immunities of NISS officials were lifted - although there have been some instances documented of immunities being lifted and prosecutions pursued with respect to military or police suspects. 29. The Author recalls that the requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies with respect to the procedures of the Commission does not require the applicant to exhaust extraordinary or administrative remedies which are unfettered by any procedures for review. The Commission has recognised that the fact that a formal legal complaint has not been submitted is not, by itself, a bar to a finding of admissibility. To this effect, the Author cite the Commission's decision in Amnesty International v Sudan3 wherein it was held that where no action has been brought by the alleged victims, the Government has been sufficiently aware of the extent that it can be presumed to know the situation prevailing within its territory as well as the content of its international obligations. 30. The Author explains that in the instant case, approaches to the NISS authorities to seek access to the Complainant by family members and lawyers while she was in detention were rebuffed. They state that on 15 May 2011, for example, a lawyer known to ACJPS approached the NISS Prosecutor in Khartoum to seek to meet Ms. Abdallah and ascertain if any charges had been filed, but his requests were ignored. 31. It explains further that the Complainant was only able to afford herself an opportunity to communicate with a lawyer or her family upon her release in Khartoum on 12th July 2011. Ultimately however it rapidly became clear to her that pursuit of a complaint against the authorities for her torture and detention was not feasible. First, during her detention NISS officials had allegedly threatened her and warned that she would be 2Farouq Mohamed Ibrahim Al Nour v (1) Government ofSudan; (2) Legislative Body; 6 November 2008. 3Communication 48/90, 50/91, 83/93 - Amnesty International, Comite Loosli Bacheland, Lawyers Committeefor Human Rights and Association ofMembers oftlie Episcopal Conference ofEast Africa v Sudan, ACHPR 1999-2000, 13"' Activity Report, para 33. 6 .
killed if she told anyone about what had unfolded while in custody. Second, in addition to the arrest and beating by the NISS of both her driver and uncle at the time of her arrest, while she was in detention two NISS officers from Khartoum travelled to El Fashir and met with her father at Abu Shouk IDP camp to interrogate him about a range of allegations which had been made about her in a statement by the Sudanese news service, the Sudan Media Centre on 8 May. 32. It is also pointed out that the Complainant's father was told that his daughter's life and that of her family would be in danger if he did not confirm these allegations. Learning about this encounter exacerbated the Complainant's concerns about the safety of her family generally, but especially if she proceeded in any way with respectto a complaint. In this regard, the Author confirms that it has documented a number of cases where family members or lawyers who acted on behalf of individuals detained by the NISS were themselves arrested and detained. 33. The Author submits further that after her release, the Complainant was made aware by a lawyer based in El Fashir that (while she was still detained charges had been filed againsther on 29 April under Article 63 of the Sudan Criminal Code 1991 (sedition).She was unable to find out, however, on what basistpr in connection with what conduct the charges were filed. According to the Complainant, the fact that she could be re-arrested any time on foot of these serious charges acted as a further deterrence to her considering seeking redress for her torture and detention. 34. The Author avers mat the Complainant was also highly sensitive to the fact that she had been forced to sign documents by NISS officials prior to her release but had not been permitted to read the texts. This added to her fear that additional charges might be under preparation: for example, as she had been forced to pose with a Bible and been photographed while in custody. The charge of apostasy was of particular concern to her. The penalty for apostasy is death under article 126(2) of the Sudanese Criminal Code 1991 and even the mere allegation carries huge social and cultural stigma. The photo of the Victim posing with a bible was published by the Sudan Media Centre on 8th May 2011. 35. The Author concludes that subsequent to her release Ms. Abdallah was in a state of considerable fear for her life from the authorities; concerned about the charges which had been filed against her, disturbed by the threats that had been made against her family and in need of medical attention. The cumulative effect of these factors, coupled with the major substantive and procedural hurdles which she faced in lodging any 7
formal complaint, was her decision not to attempt to seek redress for the harm to which she was exposed: domestic remedies were neither available, effective nor sufficient. The Author therefore submits that all the conditions for admissibility under Article 56 of the Charter have been fulfilled with respect to this Communication. The Respondent State' Submissions on Admissibility 36. The Respondent State submits that the Communication does not meet the admissibility requirements under Article 56 of the Charter, specifically subsections (4), (5) and (7). 37. The Respondent State argues that the Communication is based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media. It points out that the facts of the case and the reasons for the arrest of the Complainant as well as allegations of the torture suffered by her are all cited from a newspaper. 38. On Article 56(5), the Respondent State submits that the Author's allegation that local remedies are unavailable is ill-founded and untrue. The Respondent State cites Article 27 (3) of the 2005 Interim National Constitution of the Sudan which states that all the rights and freedoms included in any international treaty ratified by Sudan are an integral part of the Bill of Rights. 39. The Respondent State outlines the different Courts and mechanisms that an aggrieved party could approach in Sudan and cites the Commission's decision in Article 19 v Eritrea in which the Commission held that it is incumbent on the Complainant to take all necessary steps to exhaust local remedies. It submits further, citing the European Court of Human Rights, that even if the applicant has reason to believe that available domestic remedies and possible appeals will be ineffective, they shall seek those remedies since it is generally incumbent on an aggrieved individual to allow domestic courts the opportunity to develop existing rights by way of interpretation. 40. The Respondent State points out that the justification for applying the principle of exhaustion of local remedies is to give the State space to exercise its sovereignty, to apply its laws and to remedy any situation of a violation. It states that torture is prohibited under the Constitution and the rights of arrested persons are provided for under the National Security Act. According to the Respondent State, there are available and effective remedies in the Sudanese legal system which the Complainant failed to use even though it had the opportunity to do so. The Respondent State contends that the intention of the Complainant not to make use of domestic remedies is clearly
manifested in the fact that she was arrested on 6 May 2011 and the Communication was brought before the Commission on 26 June 2011. In that regard, the Respondent State refers to the Commission's decision in Law Office of Ghazi Suliman v Sudan where the Commission was of the view that a period of one month was a short interval within which the Complainant could have accessed and exhausted all local remedies. 41. The Respondent state points out that the Author's allegation that the National Security Act does not require specification of the grounds for arrest; provides no access to a lawyer at any time during detention, and contains no provisions for judicial supervision, are untrue and ill-founded. It clarifies that Article 51 of the abovementioned Act clearly provides for the right of the arrested person to be informed of the reason for the arrest, the right to be visited by his family and lawyer and the right to medical care. It states further that judicial supervision of detention is assured by the District Attorney who is under a duty to regularly inspect places of detention, receive complaints, and resort to the courts if the duration of legal detention is exceeded. 42. The Respondent State also points out that the 3 months additional renewal of detention is not the authority of the Director of National Security, but that of the NationalSecurity Council. It also points out that in practice, detainees usually exercise the right of access to family, the right to lawyer visits and the right to lodge complaints against the detaining authorities. 43. Regarding Article 56 (7), the Respondent State submits that the case has already been settled by the state given that the victim was released after the completion of investigations which were carried out in compliance with Sudanese legislation and international human rights norms. The Author's Additional submissions on Admissibility 44. The Author submits in response to the Respondent State's contention that the Communication is based exclusively on information disseminated through the mass media, that the Communication is based on information provided by the Victim, her family members and colleagues. The Author states that other independent human rights and other public reports have also been cited in the Communication to support their submissions. 45. Regarding the Respondent State's submissions on the exhaustion of local remedies, the Author submits that the mere existence of the standards and jurisdictions enumerated
by the Respondent State is of little assistance to those in national security detention if there are no effective modalities to access or activate them. The Author refers to the hurdles earlier outlined above, faced by those in national security detention, including the lack of an individual right of action which could compel the exercise by the competent prosecutor of his proprio muto powers to inspect places of detention and receive complaints. 46. The Author explains that the reason they brought the Communication before the Commission shortly after the Complainant was arrested was because she had been held incommunicado and media concerns about her treatment in detention prompted fears that she might suffer irreparable harm. They explain further that after a series of efforts to raise the matter domestically, the only channel available to them was to seek assistance from the Commission. 47. Regarding the Respondent State's submission that the case has been settled, the Author submits that Article 56(7) of the Charter is meant to prevent the submission of a Communication to multiple levels at the same time, which is not the situation in the present Communication. The Author contends that the simple fact of release of the Victim from detention does not constitute a sufficient settlement or remedy for the violation. Analysis of the Commission on Admissibility 48. The Admissibility of Communications submitted to the Commission is governed by the requirements contained in Article 56 of the African Charter. Article 56 comprises seven requirements which must be cumulatively complied with for a Communication to be admissible. The Author submits that these requirements have been complied with except the one relating to the exhaustion of local remedies under Article 56 (5), for which it has set out reasons why the requirement must be dispensed with. 49. The Respondent State on the other hand argues that the Communication should be declared inadmissible because it does not meet the admissibility requirements under Article 56 (4) (5) and (7). 50. From the above submissions of the parties, it appears that the requirements under subsections (1) (2) (3) and (6) of Article 56 raise no contentious issues. The Commission after carefully examining the facts and submissions considers that the requirements
under the above provisions have been complied with and will proceed to examine the contentious requirements in detail. 51. Article 56(4) of the Charter provides that Communications relating to human and peoples' rights shall be considered by the Commission if they 'are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media'. The Respondent State claims that the information contained in the Communication is based exclusively on disseminated in the mass media; a fact which the Complainant contests. news 52. In examining this requirement, the Commission recalls its jurisprudence wherein it dealt with cases with similar contentions under Article 56(4). In Dawda Jawara v The Gambia,4 the Commission had held that "while it would be dangerous to rely exclusively on news disseminated from the mass media, it would be equally damaging if the Commission were to reject a Communication because some aspects of it are based on news disseminated through the mass media. This is borne out of the fact that the African Charter makes use of the word 'exclusively'. 53. The submissions from the Author, while admitting that some of the allegations draw upon media reports, all the information contained therein cannot be said to be based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media. For one thing, the Author has indicated that the Communication is based on information provided by the Complainant, her family members and colleagues. Additionally, sources, other than media reports have been cited in the Communication. The Commission, is thus of the view that the claim that the Author's allegations as filed before the Commission are exclusively based on news reports cannot be sustained. 54. Article 56(5) of the African Charter requires that Communications be "sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged". 55. The Author submits that it has not, nor did it attempt to exhaust local remedies, advancing a number of reasons that warrant that the requirement to exhaust local remedies be dispensed with in the present Communication. The Author outlines various factors that rendered the exhaustion of local remedies impossible, namely the absence of effective modalities for lodging complaints concerning allegations of torture, 4Communication 149/94/149/96 - Sir Dawda Jawara v The Gambia (2000) ACHPR. 11
the immunity enjoyed by NISS officials and the threats and intimidation to which the victim and her family were subjected. 56. The Respondent State has on the other hand outlined the various norms and mechanisms that exist in Sudan which could be made use of by the Complainant. The Respondent State has explained that the Complainant had the opportunity to seek redress domestically but had no intention to do so citing the submission of the Communication to the Commission shortly after she was arrested, as a manifestation of the her unwillingness to seek domestic redress. 57. The Commission has consistently reiterated in its jurisprudence that the requirement to exhaust local remedies is necessitated by the imperative of giving the state notice of alleged violations that have occurred in its territory and affording the authorities of the State Party an opportunity to address the alleged violation. In the present Communication, it has been demonstrated in the Author's submissions above that the Sudanese authorities were sufficiently notified of the violations perpetrated against the Victim. The Respondent State has not refuted the fact that it was notified of the alleged violations against the victim. Without any argument from the Respondent State to the contrary, the Commission considers that the Respondent State was notified of the violations, failed to act on them and as a consequence, loses its prerogative to settle the matter domestically.5 58. The Commission notes the Author's submissions regarding the unavailability of local remedies. The Author has explained that there are no effective modalities for lodging complaints regarding allegations of torture and arbitrary detention by the NISS; that no individual right of action is available which would permit the Complainant to request the proprio muto powers vested on the Prosecution Attorney by Sudanese legislation to commence an investigation upon receiving notice of a violation, and the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by NISS officials under the law which can only be waived at the sole discretion of the Director of the NISS. 59. Although the Respondent State has clearly outlined the mechanism that exist under domestic law which aggrieved individuals could approach, it has not shown how these mechanisms could be made use of by the Complainant in the circumstances of her case. The Respondent State has not refuted the existence of the hurdles outlined by the 5Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, Communication 296/2005.
Author, which in effect render the availability of the remedies enumerated by the Respondent State, questionable and ineffective in the circumstances of the present case. 60. Additionally, the Commission considers the granting of blanket immunities to NISS officials as an impediment to the exhaustion of local remedies since there is no evidence that there is a legal obligation on the part of the NISS hierarchy to lift the immunity of an official who is suspected of committing an offence. Because of the immunity granted to NISS officers, no criminal action could be brought against them unless such immunities were lifted, which immunities could only be lifted by the NISS hierarchy which in any case, has no obligation to do so. 61. The Commission considers that the hurdles outlined above are a significant bar to access to local remedies for victims of serious crimes such as torture and other forms of ill-treatment. One of the primary obligations of the State under the Charter in respect of allegations of torture is for the state to among other thing, initiate a prompt, impartial and effective investigation. It is also incumbent on the state to establish readily accessible mechanisms to which victims can bring their complaints and above all, to ensure that acts of torture are distinct offences under the law. The State is also expected to ensure that anyone who commits the serious crime of torture does not enjoy immunity.6 62. It is evident from the Author's submissions that the Respondent State failed in upholding these principles, thus causing significant impediments to the exhaustion of local remedies. In the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to expect the Complainant to overcome all these hurdles in pursuit of exhausting local remedies. In light of this the Commission agrees with the Author that local remedies were not available or even if they were theoretically available, could not be effectively made use of in the Complainant's circumstances. 63. The Author has also pointed out that the seriousness of the alleged false charges against the Complainant, the treatment she was subjected to while in detention, and the threats and intimidation directed at her following her release, generated considerable fear which prevented her from pursuing her case before the Sudanese authorities. The 6See Articles 4, 16 (b), 17 and 18 of the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention ofTorture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment commonly known as the Robben Island Guidelines. It should be noted that the Robben Island Guidelines are an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of Article 5 of the Charter in respect of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 13
Respondent State has not refuted any of these allegations. The Commission has consistently emphasized that victims of human rights violation who find themselves in life threatening situation as well as persistent threats of persecution and harm cannot be required as a matter of principle to exhaust local remedies.7 64. From the forgoing, it is the view of the Commission that local remedies though theoretically available, were ineffective in the situation of the victims and therefore the requirement of Article 56 (5) is accordingly dispensed with. 65. Article 56 (7) of the Charter provides that Communications shall be considered by the Commission if they 'do not deal with cases which have been settled by the State involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter'. 66. It is submitted by the Respondent State that the case was already settled by the State upon the release of the Complainant after completion of the investigations. The Author has submitted that Article 56(7) is intended to prevent the submission of a Communication to multiple human rights bodies at the international level at the same time, which is not the case with the present Communication. 67. The Commission recalls its jurisprudence in Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v The Sudan, where it held that 'a matter shall be considered settled within the context of Article 56 (7) of the African Charter, if it was settled by any of the UN human rights treaty bodies or any other international adjudication mechanism, with a human rights mandate. The Respondent State must demonstrate to the Commission the nature of remedies or relief granted by the international mechanism, such as to render the complaint res judicata, and the African Commission's intervention unnecessary.8 68. It follows that the release of the Complainant, after investigations by the authorities of the Respondent State cannot amount to the case being settled in terms of Article 56 (7) of the Charter. 7See Jawara v The Gambia (2000) ACHPR and IHRDA (on behalf of Sierra Leonean Refugees in Guinea v Guinea (2004) ACHPR para 33. 8Communication 279/03 &296/05 - Sudan Human Rights Organisation &and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v The Sudan. 14
69. In view of the above, the Commission declares the Communication admissible. Merits The Author's submissions on the Merits 70. The Author submits that the actions of the Complainant's arbitrary arrest and the actions of the Respondent State that followed the arrest violate Articles 4, 4, 6, 7,12 and 16 of the Charter. Alleged violation of Article 4 71. According to the Authors, the treatment to which the Complainant was subjected following her arrest and incommunicado detention both in 2009 and 2011, including various acts of torture and threats of death purportedly directed against her by NISS officials gave rise to a very real fear for her safety and life, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter. In reaching this conclusion, the Authors recall the Jurisprudence of the Commission in Aminu Kazeem v Nigeria9 in which the Commission stated that it would be a narrow interpretation of the right to life to think that it would be violated only when one is deprived of it. Alleged Violation of Article 5 72. The Author submits that while in the custody of the NISS in El Fashir and in Khartoum, the Complainant was subjected to a series of Acts, which singly and in combination caused severe physical and mental pain and suffering inflicted by officials with the purpose of extracting information and inflicting punishment. According to the author, Ms. Abdallah was subjected to sustained severe beatings that amounted to torture. It is submitted that during her arrest, she was repeatedly slapped and beaten by the arresting officers with the butts of their guns. She was also allegedly punched, whipped and beaten with various objects including an iron rod and metal wires and subjected to other physical forms of abuse during the period of her detention. 73. The Author claims that the Complainant was raped on three occasions by NISS officers in El Fashir which led to physical and mental anguish owing to the stigma and risk of additional harm associated with the risk of being a rape victim in Sudan. The Author Communication 205/97, ACHPR (2000) 13 AR.
further claims that the Complainant was subjected to subjected to electric shocks on her chest, nails and shoulders as punishment for shouting for help while she was being raped. It is also submitted that a chemical solution was applied to her scalp, causing a large circular spot and an itchy skin condition that has persisted after her release. 74. In addition, the Author submits that the Complainant was threatened on various occasions, denied medical attention during her detention and was detained incommunicado. Referring to various international and regional standards and decisions of the Commission, the Author submits that the acts described above, singly and in combination amount to a violation of Article 5 of the Charter. Alleged violation of Article 6 75. According to the Author, the Complainant was detained for two months and thereafter released without charge. She was allegedly never shown a warrant for her arrestor any other document relating to her detention. It is submitted that she was accused of serious crimes, including some carrying heavy penalties such as the crime of apostasy and spying for the US and some European Embassies in Sudan and providing false information to humanitarian and human rights organizations about the situation of IDPs. 76. The Author avers that after the Complainant was released, she was made aware by a lawyer based in El Fashir that on 29 April 2011, prior to her arrest on 6 May 2011; charges of sedition under Article 63 of the Sudanese Penal Code had been filed against her. She was not however aware on what basis and in relation to which conduct the charges had been filed. The Author also contends that the Complainant's arrest was not based on a reasonable suspicion. The Author claims that the Complainant's arrest and detention was therefore arbitrary. 11. The conformity of the domestic legislation (the National Security Act, NSA) under which the Complainant was purportedly detained with Article 6 of the Charter is also called into question by the Author. According to the Author, Article 50 (e - h) of the NSA gives NISS members wide powers to arrest and detain a person on vague grounds for up to thirty days and a possible total of four and a half months without the possibility of judicial. The Author avers thatthe legislation lacks the requisite specificity under the Charter given that there is no explicit requirement for the NISS to issue specific criminal charges. 16 - .- •- -\
Alleged violation of Article 7 78. The Author submits that the Complainant's right to a fair trial under Article 7 was violated given that she was detained for two months without charge, not informed of the reason for her arrest and denied access to a lawyer. The Authors avers that Ms. Abdallah was detained incommunicado and denied access to the outside world except for a one thirty minute supervised meeting with the then UNAMID Joint Special Representative for Dafur, at an unknown date. The Author cites various international and regional standards as well as decisions of the Commission to support its argument. 79. The Author also avers that Article 51 (2) of the NSA also violates Article 7 (1) (c) of the Charter as it only allow communication with and visits by family members and lawyers of a detained person if this does not prejudice the progress of interrogation, enquiry and investigation. This, according to the Author means that the NISS may still hold detainees incommunicado where it sees it fit. Alleged Violation of Article 12 80. The Author submits that the Complainant's right to freedom of movement was violated by the Respondent State as a result of her arbitrary arrest, detention and the threats which were directed at her and her family, all of which forced her to flee from Sudan to the US where she was admitted as a refugee on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. The fear of persecution has also prevented her from returning to Sudan. This, the Author claims is in violation of her right to freedom of movement residence as well as her right to return to her country, contrary to Article 12 of the Charter. Alleged violation of Article 16 81. In the Author's view, the Complainant was subjected to a range of acts of torture that caused extreme physical pain and anguish and allegedly denied medical treatment despite repeated request in violation of her right to health under Article 16 of the Charter. Alleged Violation of Article 1 82. According to the Author, in addition to a failure to respect the rights outlined in this communication under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, 12and 16 of the Charter, the Respondent State has also failed in its positive obligation under Article 1 to exercise due diligence 17
and effectively prevent and respond to violations of the rights enshrined in the Charter. Specifically, the respondent state has failed to put in place an adequate legislative framework to protect individuals within its jurisdiction from arbitrary detention, torture and other ill treatment by the NISS or to ensure the right to fair trial or the availability of effective remedies and sanctions in the event of a breach. It has also failed to investigate allegations of wrongdoings by its agents and took no measures to ensure the availability of an effective remedy in the Complainant's case. The Commission's Assessment on the Merits 83. The Commission is called upon to determine whether the alleged actions of the Respondent State as outlined above infringed the provisions of Articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12 and 16 of the Charter. 84. The Commission notes that while the Respondent State submitted on the Admissibility of the Communication, it has not made any observations on the Author's submissions on the Merits. In the presentcircumstances and in accordance with the practice of the Commission as enunciated in the case ofInstitute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Republic of Angola, Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l'Homme, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 1'Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de 1'Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de 1'Homme au Senegal and Association Malienne des Droits de 1'Homme/Republic of Angola, "in the face of the state's failure to address itself to the complaint filed against it, the African Commission has no option but to proceed with its consideration of the Communication in accordance with its Rules of Procedure." 85. In the same decision, the Commission re-affirmed its position by holding that "... it would proceed to consider Communications on the basis of the submission of the Complainants and information at its disposal, even if the State fails to submit." The Commission must consequently give due weight to the Complainant's allegations insofar as these have been adequately substantiated. 86. The Commission considers that an allegation is sufficiently substantiated where the Complainant provides evidence which leads to conclusions consistent with the facts. 87. The Commission notes that in the present Communication, the Author has recounted events which it claims constituted violations of the Complainant's rights under the 18
Charter. Apart from links to some media reports, no other evidence has been provided to substantiate these allegations.10 While these media articles confirm that the Complainant was arrested, they do not detail the circumstances of the arrest nor do they confirm that the alleged violations indeed happened in the circumstances intimated by the Author. !. The Author has not provided any other piece of evidence to substantiate its allegations; not even the Complainant's testimony has been tendered in evidence. In its submissions, the Author has made reference to interviews they had with the Complainant. However, no transcripts of such interviews have been made available to the Commission. No medical certificates or psychological reports have been tendered to substantiate the torture or ill-treatment of the Complainant. The Author has not also alleged the impossibility of obtaining these pieces of evidence, nor have they alleged any difficulties they encountered in obtaining same. While the Author seems to suggest that the Complainant was not in the mood to discuss her treatment when she was released, purportedly because of trauma, the Author has confirmed that it indeed had interviews with her. This appears to be contradictory. 89. The Commission considers that in cases of such a nature, at least the Complainant's sworn testimony would suffice to substantiate the allegations. In the absence of any testimony from the Complainant and any other supporting evidence, the Commission is of the view that the alleged violations have not been sufficiently substantiated. 90. In view of the above, the Commission considers that the information before it is insufficient to support the finding of a violation. 91. The Commission decides as a consequence to dismiss the Communication. Done in Banjul, The Gambia at the 17th Extraordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights held from 19 - 28 February 2015. 10 Thefollowing are some of the reports relied on bythe Author: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7685248.stm ; which details conditions in the Abou Ahouk refugee camp and confirms that the Complainantwas a language translator for UNAMID: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7057949.stm features the Complainant in an interview: http://www.amnestv.orR/es/library/asset/AFR54/015/2011/es/799bccee-3551-4d71-8262- 67490ec22b85/afr540152011en.pdfan Amnesty International Press Release on the Complainant's arrest and incommunicado detention: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13808969 ; BBC news article quoting the Amnesty International Press Release about the Complainant's arrest.

Created Apr 15, 2026 · Edited Jun 10, 2026